

NEW WINE IN OLD BOTTLES:  
An Analysis of Pakistan's Conflict in the Pashtun Tribal Areas

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## **ABSTRACT**

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan have regained prominence in recent years because of the U.S.' "war on terror" against Al-Qaeda. The Government of Pakistan, backed by the U.S. and NATO, is involved in a bloody conflict with Taliban sympathizers and other violence entrepreneurs in FATA. But this is not the first time that such a conflict has occurred in Pakistan's frontier. For nearly a century, the British experimented with various policies and strategies to try and incorporate the tribes who resisted what they considered foreign invasion. This thesis will examine the current conflict in the historical context, and analyze the relationship between economic development and conflict, specifically in Waziristan, where many of the violence entrepreneurs stem from. It will examine the social, political and economic structure of the Pashtun society and analyze the impact of war on women, one of the most marginalized groups in society.

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## **Chapter One**

### **Introduction**

*“You don’t speak Paxto; you do Paxto”*  
Pashtun Proverb<sup>1</sup>

As the U.S.-led “war on terror” plays out in Iraq and Afghanistan, a relatively unknown region of the world is quickly taking center stage. Waziristan, a mountainous territory in the northwest frontier of Pakistan, has become the site of a new conflict that threatens to destabilize the security situation in Southwest Asia. Dubbed “wilder than the Wild West” by U.S. President George W. Bush,<sup>2</sup> Waziristan has become a deadly ground for the clash between the U.S.-backed Government of Pakistan and violence entrepreneurs who call themselves the Taliban.

Pakistan, a country of 159 million people,<sup>3</sup> registered rapid economic growth following President Pervez Musharraf’s military coup in 1999. Its gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an average rate of 6 percent from 2000 to 2008,<sup>4</sup> thanks to an increase in foreign direct investment and aid. The government also introduced policy reforms that included cutting the budget deficit, increasing tax revenues, relaxing trade restrictions and privatizing state-owned firms.<sup>5</sup> Foreign Private Investment from

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<sup>1</sup> Benedicte Grima, *The Performance of Emotion Among Paxtun Women*, (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1992), 4.

<sup>2</sup> The White House, “President Bush Discusses Progress in Afghanistan, Global War on Terror,” February 15, 2007, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/02/20070215-1.html>.

<sup>3</sup> The World Bank Group, “Pakistan Data Profile,” World Bank Development Indicators Database, April 2007, <http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP&CCODE=PAK>.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Moreau, Ron, “Promise in Pakistan: What’s Behind one of the World’s Most Economic Success Stories?” *Newsweek*, March 27, 2006.

2006 to 2007 alone increased by nearly 80 percent to \$7 billion.<sup>6</sup> Agreements to develop new projects, such as the Gwadar port and a potential gas pipeline between Iran, Pakistan and India, also boosted hope for Pakistan's economy, which fledged for most of the 1990s.

But the economy overheated in 2008. Average inflation from FY2007 to FY2008<sup>7</sup> rose to 12 percent.<sup>8</sup> Inflation in June 2008 of 21.5 percent, compared to June 2007, was the highest since the 1970s.<sup>9</sup> The Pakistani rupee has depreciated by more than 20 percent against the U.S. dollar since June 2007.<sup>10</sup> Foreign Private Investment declined by 25.7 percent to \$5 billion during FY2008.<sup>11</sup> While the State Bank of Pakistan's provisional data indicates that GDP grew by almost 6 percent in FY2008,<sup>12</sup> the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has said that the Government of Pakistan needs to tighten its fiscal and monetary policies and reduce the external account deficit to strengthen its economy.<sup>13</sup>

The political and social climate of the country has also deteriorated. Then-President Pervez Musharraf's sacking of the judges and chief justice of the Supreme Court in November 2007 caused uproar in the legal community. Former Prime

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<sup>6</sup> State Bank of Pakistan, "Net Inflow of Foreign Investment in Pakistan," <http://www.sbp.org.pk/ecodata/NetinflowSummary.pdf>.

<sup>7</sup> FY stands for Fiscal Year.

<sup>8</sup> State Bank of Pakistan, "Trends in Inflation," <http://www.sbp.org.pk/ecodata/pricei.pdf>.

<sup>9</sup> Sahar Ahmed, "Pakistan Needs Tighter Fiscal, Monetary Policy – IMF," *Reuters*, July 25, 2008, <http://in.reuters.com/article/asiaCompanyAndMarkets/idINSIN2956120080725>.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> State Bank of Pakistan, "Net Inflow."

<sup>12</sup> State Bank of Pakistan, "Real GDP (Sector Wise Data)," [http://www.sbp.org.pk/ecodata/GDP\\_table.pdf](http://www.sbp.org.pk/ecodata/GDP_table.pdf).

<sup>13</sup> International Monetary Fund, "Transcript of a Press Briefing by David Hawley, Senior Advisor, External Relations Department, IMF," July 24, 2008, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2008/tr080724.htm>.



Minister Benazir Bhutto was killed in December 2007, putting into power her widower Asif Zardari, who spent years in prison on numerous corruption charges. Musharraf stepped down from his post on August 18, 2008 amid impeachment charges drawn up by a coalition of opposition parties. While his resignation was celebrated by many, it has left the country devoid of a leadership and there is little agreement even among the opposition groups on who should be elected. Amid the economic and political woes facing the country, the surge of Taliban sympathizers and violence entrepreneurs<sup>14</sup> in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) has created a dilemma for the Pakistani government and Western powers, and threatens to not only further destabilize the already-precarious security situation in Pakistan but also the “war on terror” being fought by the U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan and against Al-Qaeda.

Table 1– Pakistan’s Data Profile

	2000	2005	2006
Population, total	138.1 million	155.8 million	159 million
Population Growth (annual %)	2.4	2.4	2.1
GDP (current US\$)*	74 billion	109.5 billion	126.8 billion
GDP growth (annual %)	4.3	7.7	6.9
GNI per capita (current US\$)**	490	720	800
Foreign Direct Investment, net inflows (current US\$)	308 million	2.2 billion	4.3 billion
Official development assistance and official aid (current US\$)	692.4 million	1.6 billion	2.1 billion

Source: The World Bank Group, “Pakistan Data Profile,” 2007.

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<sup>14</sup> “Violence entrepreneurs” are rebels who gain from war politically and/or commercially, and head private military organizations that run protection rackets at the expense of the general public. See Paul Collier, V.L. Elliott, Havard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol and Nicholas Sambinas, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, (Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003), 82-89.

NOTE: \*GDP = gross domestic product  
\*\*GNI per capita = gross national income per capita

This thesis will examine the historical, economic, political, religious and cultural forces impacting the conflict in Waziristan. It will explore the history of the region, focusing on British colonial history, and will also analyze the current conflict in a historical context. The definitions of tribe and state will be examined.

Furthermore, this research will utilize conflict theories to study the relationship between economic conditions and war in Waziristan. The paper will shed light on the impact of foreign aid on the conflict and, in turn, the effect of war on one of the most marginalized groups in Waziristan - women. This thesis also will analyze the role of women in the region, their part in the development process, and their role in the conflict.

### *I. Land of Insolence*<sup>15</sup>

Waziristan, divided into North and South agencies, is part of Pakistan's seven semi-autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Waziristan also includes tribal areas adjoining the Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and the Dera Ismail Khan districts of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP).<sup>16</sup> FATA, encompassing 27,220 square kilometers, forms a 1,200-kilometer boundary with Afghanistan.<sup>17</sup>

FATA was created in 1893 following the establishment of the Durand Line, named after Sir Mortimer Durand who negotiated the delineation with the Amir of

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<sup>15</sup> Mountstuart Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul*, 2nd ed. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1972), 80.

<sup>16</sup> The Crisis Group, *Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants*. (Brussels, Belgium: Asia Report No. 124, 11 December 2006).

<sup>17</sup> Hassan Abbas, "Profile of Pakistan's Seven Tribal Agencies," *Terrorism Monitor*, Jamestown Foundation, 4, no. 20 (19 October 2006): 2.

Afghanistan. The arbitrary border, drawn up by the British to distinguish their territory and sphere of influence from that of the Amir, split Pashtun communities between Afghanistan and the Raj, and upon partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, became the permanent border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Past governments in Afghanistan have rejected the Durand Line, saying that it was never meant to be a formal international boundary. According to Afghanistan, the demarcation by the British did not apply after Pakistan was created.<sup>18</sup> Pakistan has vehemently denied this position, claiming that since the treaty that created the Durand Line would never expire, the border is legitimate. Previous governments of Afghanistan, encouraged by the Russians, have also called for the self-determination of Pashtuns in the form of an independent Pukhtunistan, which has never existed as a political entity.

FATA has a predominantly Pashtun population of 3.2 million, about 2 percent of Pakistan's population, according to the 1998 government census.<sup>19</sup> South Waziristan is the largest agency in FATA; it is 6,620 square kilometers in area with a population of 425,000 comprising mainly of the Mahsud and Wazir tribes.<sup>20</sup> North Waziristan, 4,707 square kilometers in area, is the second largest agency, home to about 375,000 people belonging to the Wazir and Dawar tribes.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> S.M.M. Quraishi, "Pakhtunistan: The Frontier Dispute Between Afghanistan and Pakistan," *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 39, no. ½ (Spring – Summer 1966): 99.

<sup>19</sup> Population Census Organization, *Population by Province/Region Since 1951*, Government of Pakistan, [http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/pco/statistics/pop\\_by\\_province/pop\\_by\\_province.html](http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/pco/statistics/pop_by_province/pop_by_province.html).

<sup>20</sup> Abbas, "Pakistan's Tribal Agencies," 4.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

Figure 1 - Pakistan's Tribal Lands



Source: PBS, "Return of the Taliban," Frontline.

\* Pakistan's tribal areas comprise of seven agencies bordering Afghanistan. The Khyber Pass is the historic gateway between Pakistan and Afghanistan through which Alexander the Great and founder of the Mughal Empire, Babar, passed through.

About sixty miles across at its widest point,<sup>22</sup> Waziristan's geography and climate is harsh, even more so than the cold, mountainous ranges of Northern Pakistan. The southern portion of this "frontier Switzerland" is a "tangled mass of mountains;" however, North Waziristan is more open, "consisting of large and fertile valleys separated by high barren hills."<sup>23</sup> The climate is severe, with intensely hot summers and cold winters.

The inhabitants of Waziristan are by and large Pashtun and strict Sunni Muslims. Hindu traders resided in the region before the subcontinent was partitioned, but left when Pakistan became an independent state and the tribes became a part of Pakistan. The Wazirs are the largest tribal group, with the territory named after them, but Mahsuds are the dominant tribe. Mahsuds are the most independent and literate of all the tribes and have produced many civil and military officers.<sup>24</sup> Some of them have also established trade and business networks across Pakistan. The two tribes have been feuding for decades, with each attempting to court the governments of Britain, Afghanistan and then Pakistan to win concessions. Both tribes are proud of their reputation as warriors and are known for their blood feuds and rivalries.<sup>25</sup> As the analysis of conflict in the FATA will show, tribesmen are divided in their loyalties for the Taliban and violence entrepreneurs. But unlike their past feuds, this inter-tribal conflict has international consequences.

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<sup>22</sup> Hugh Beattie, *Imperial Frontier: Tribe and State in Waziristan*, (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2002), 1.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>24</sup> Abbas, "Pakistan's Tribal Agencies," 4.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

FATA is divided into three jurisdictions: inaccessible areas, administered areas and protected areas.<sup>26</sup> In inaccessible areas, the government has little or no oversight and the tribes are responsible for regulating themselves; in the administered areas, the Political Agent serves as the representative of the government and is in charge of overseeing administrative work such as roads and schools and generally maintaining order and suppressing crime; in the protected areas, crimes and issues are not resolved in the courts, but in the *jirga*, a council of elders that deals with civil and criminal offences in line with *rewaj*, or custom.<sup>27</sup>

While part of Pakistan, Waziristan does not have well-defined political boundaries. As anthropologist and former Political Agent Akbar Ahmed said, beyond one hundred yards of the main Agency road, the laws and authority of the central government are replaced by tradition and customs.<sup>28</sup> FATA is included among the “territories” of Pakistan under Article 1 of Pakistan’s Constitution. It is represented in the National Assembly and the Senate but remains under the direct executive authority of the president of Pakistan, and laws framed by the Parliament do not apply in FATA unless ordered by the president.<sup>29</sup> FATA is governed under the 1901 Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), which allows tribes to settle disputes and issues through the tribal *jirgas* rather than in courts, and regulate their own affairs in accordance with their customs.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> The Crisis Group, *Pakistan’s Tribal Areas*, 4.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Akbar S. Ahmed, *Resistance and Control in Pakistan*, Revised Edition, (New York: Routledge, 2004), xxii.

<sup>29</sup> FATA, “Administrative System,” <http://www.fata.gov.pk/subpages/admnssystem.php>.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

Figure 2– Federally Administered Tribal Areas



Source: FATA Development Authority.

\* FR = Frontier Regions

The Political Agent, appointed by the Pakistani government, serves as the intermediary between the tribes and the state and is in charge of implementing economic and social plans approved by the federal and provincial governments for FATA. The Political Agent, in theory, is also responsible for regulating trade and illicit activities in the tribal agencies, although that can be a difficult task for many because of the obscure tribal networks that are difficult to infiltrate. There are also a host of other positions that fall below that of the Political Agent. The porous Pak-Afghan border has mostly been left alone by the government, and the tribes, who have never fully recognized the official line, cross in and out of Afghanistan freely.

The current system, which involves minimal government activity in tribal areas, was established by the British who wanted to maintain some control in the area without completely taking away the tribes' independence. The controversial FCR,<sup>31</sup> created by the British in 1901, still applies, although Pakistan's Prime Minister, Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani, who took office in February 2008, has called for its abolishment under heavy criticism.<sup>32</sup>

The dominant group among the tribes is the *maliks*, or the chiefs, but even they possess influence rather than power.<sup>33</sup> The *maliks* act as intermediaries between

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<sup>31</sup> Dubbed the "Black Law" by locals. Under FCR, FATA is not subject to Supreme Court or High Court jurisdiction. Additionally, no federal and provincial laws apply to this area, and the people do not pay any taxes.

<sup>32</sup> Ismail Khan, "Implications of Repealing FCR," *Dawn*, March 30, 2008, <http://www.dawn.com/2008/03/30/top4.htm>.

<sup>33</sup> Akbar S. Ahmed, *Millenium and Charisma Among Pathans: A Critical Essay in Social Anthropology*, (London: Routledge, 1976), 74.



the administration and the tribes.<sup>34</sup> The elders traditionally have held great sway and serve on the *jirga*, but even their authority has diminished under the increasing influence of young tribesmen who are joining violence entrepreneurs in a rebellion against the Government of Pakistan.

Visitors to some tribal areas have to be granted special permission by the Government of Pakistan to enter those areas, which is difficult to obtain because the government has to provide security and armed guards to accompany visitors.<sup>35</sup>

## II. Living by the Code

Pashtuns are also known as Pathans, Pakhtuns, Pukhtuns, Paktoon and have been designated various names by colonial administrators, academics and writers. According to anthropologist and former Political Agent of South Waziristan, Akbar S. Ahmed, they are one of the largest tribal groupings in the world.<sup>36</sup> “Pathan tribal society is part of the ‘larger’ or ‘greater’ tradition of the Islamic world. To the Pathan there is no conflict between his tribal code, ‘*Pukhtunwali*’, and religious principles and he boasts no pre-Islamic period. Islamic principles, cultural mores, and jural tradition explain part of Pathan normative behavior.”<sup>37</sup> All Pashtun tribes claim descent from Qais bin Rashid, who went to Arabia from Kohistan in Afghanistan and was converted to Islam by Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Rustam Shah Mohmand, “Understanding Insurgency in FATA: A Civilian Perspective,” *Business Recorder*, February 22, 2008.

<sup>35</sup> Imran Khan, *Ghairat Mand Musalman*, (Karachi: Shaukhat Khanum Memorial Trust, 1995), 1.

<sup>36</sup> Ahmed, *Millenium and Charisma Among Pathans*, 6.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 7.

While Pashtuns are split on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border, they are not one and the same. “Though ethnically Pathan, the Afghan government was culturally more Persian”<sup>39</sup> until the advent of the Taliban. “The Pathan tribes on either side of the border saw themselves as the subjects of no power.”<sup>40</sup> Unlike tribes in other areas of Pakistan, there are not any defined leaders in most Pashtun communities. The *jirga* is elected to arbitrate disputes but the hierarchical structure is less rigid than that of other Pakistani tribes in Baluchistan and Sindh. Even the *malik* is only a liaison between the government and his tribe, rather than a leader. In many ways, it is also a lawless and anarchic society; there is no one person that holds ultimate power or makes decisions.

The Pashtuns have often been portrayed as harsh characters by both the British and Pakistanis alike. According to Imran Khan, the people were wilder than the cowboys he saw in Hollywood movies; every man had a rifle.<sup>41</sup> For generations, Pashtuns in these areas have been surviving by raids, looting and kidnapping. During the time of the British, tribesmen raided the nearby “settled areas” because their harsh environments and surroundings presented few other opportunities.

So long as hungry tribesmen inhabit barren and almost waterless hills, which command open and fertile plains, so long will they resort to plundering incursions in order to obtain the necessities of life... The greater part of Waziristan is a region of stony nullahs and barren plains, with only occasional stretches of cultivated land in the warmer valleys... When writers describe the Pathan as having the lawlessness of centuries in his blood, when they state that the plundering of caravans and the raiding of the *daman* have been his

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<sup>39</sup> Peter J. Brobst, *The Future of the Great Game: Sir Olaf Caroe, India's Independence, and the Defense of Asia*, (Akron, Ohio: The University of Akron Press, 2005), 104.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> C. Collin Davies, *The Problem of the North-West Frontier: 1890-1908*, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1932), 179.

occupation from time immemorial, what they really mean is that he has been forced by his environment to play this role in the drama of life.<sup>42</sup>

According to historian Hugh Beattie, the Pashtuns tend to inhabit their own moral world, which is defined by *Pukhtunwali*.<sup>43</sup> Elphinstone described it as a “rude system” that would have prevailed “before the institution of a civil government.”<sup>44</sup> For Pashtuns, it is the code of life, with its three main characteristics: honor, hospitality and revenge. Ahmed dubs it as the “Pukhtun ideal-type.”<sup>45</sup> Its traditional features are courage (*tora*), revenge (*badal*), hospitality (*melmastia*), generosity to a defeated opponent (*nanawatee*), and heeding the voice of the *jirga*, which constitutes the tribesmen’s government.<sup>46</sup> *Pukhtunwali* explains the fiercely independent nature of the tribes and their constant shuffles amongst themselves and with the reigning government.<sup>47</sup> The concept of revenge means that blood feuds that started generations ago prevail to this day. As the following chapters will show, Pashtuns welcomed refugees, fellow Pashtuns and Taliban sympathizers from Afghanistan and other central Asian countries under the code of hospitality, which is so important to the Pashtuns that often times they will go well above their means to fulfill this duty.

Under *Nanawatai* (an extension of *Melmastia*) a person who has a favour to ask goes to the house or tent of the man on whom it depends and refuses to sit on his carpet, or partake of his hospitality, until he shall grant the boon required. The honour of the party solicited will incur a stain if he does not

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<sup>42</sup> Khan, *Ghairat Mand Musalman*, 15.

<sup>43</sup> Beattie, *Imperial Frontier*, 7.

<sup>44</sup> Elphinstone, *Account of the Kingdom of Caubul*, 100.

<sup>45</sup> Ahmed, *Resistance and Control in Pakistan*, 24.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> The concept of *Pukhtunwali* is unique to the Pashtuns, and is often difficult to grasp by those not familiar with this group and the region they inhabit. While looting and killing may not be deemed “honorable” in many societies, to the Pashtun, honor comprises of defending one’s religion, custom and family, and goes hand in hand with the concept of revenge and courage.

grant the favour asked. The giving of hospitality to the guest is a national point of honour, so much so that the reproach to an inhospitable man is that he is devoid of Pakhtu, a creature of contempt.<sup>48</sup>

Honor is an especially important characteristic of the Pashtun society, especially when it comes to women.

### III. Methodology

Waziristan and the FATA region in general has been scantily explored and written about. Some of the most important literature about the area has been written by British historians. Very few contemporary scholars have focused on the region; however, its growing importance in the “war on terror” has put FATA under the political and media spotlight. But overall, academic data about the people of Waziristan is insufficient, and while the area has taken center stage in the *New York Times* and Pakistani newspapers in recent years, only a few reporters have been able to capture the true essence of the conflict and the people. There is even less literature about women, understandably so, because most researchers have been male and it is very difficult for researchers to break into women’s circles because of the deep segregation and isolation of women. A big obstacle in this research has been the lack of credible statistics about the economic and social situation of FATA, either from the Government of Pakistan or scholars.

This thesis is based on extensive historical and contemporary qualitative research. The whole FATA region in general provides a fascinating study of the psyche of Pashtuns and the current conflict that is brewing in Pakistan, but this

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<sup>48</sup> Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans: 550 B.C. – A.D. 1957*, (London: MacMillan & Co Ltd, 1958), 351.

research specifically aims to explore the region of Waziristan, which is at the epicenter of the conflict. The primary sources for this research are historical documents compiled by the British, including books and memoirs at the India Office Library at the British Library. This research also relies on quantitative data from the World Bank, United Nations agencies, the International Monetary Fund, the Government of Pakistan and State Bank of Pakistan. Given the dearth of published data and academic literature about the FATA, this research also takes incorporates news reports, specifically from the BBC, *The New York Times* and the Pakistani press, among others.

FATA, especially North and South Waziristan agencies, have to be studied and analyzed as separate entities from the rest of the nation-state because the trajectory of their economic, geopolitical and social development has been very different from the rest of the country. In Pakistan's urban areas, Waziristan is popularly known as *ilaga ghair*, the "foreign area" or "outside the area"<sup>49</sup> where murderers, bandits and thieves find refuge. While part of Pakistan, Pashtuns in Waziristan do not consider themselves bound by government laws that apply to them. Historically, Pashtuns in FATA have had close relations with Afghans. During the time of the British rule, Mahsuds and Waziris were paid concessions by the Amir of Afghanistan to guard the passes. Nevertheless, the tribes have never proclaimed allegiance to any Afghan or Pakistani authority.

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<sup>49</sup> Akbar S. Ahmed, *Pukhtun Economy and Society*, (London: Routledge, 1980), 11.

Waziristan falls into what Ahmed classifies as a *nang* group – tribal or “hill” Pashtuns that “organize social life according to traditional tribal customs and codes... In the absence of any other law, life revolves around ‘Pukhtunwali.’”<sup>50</sup> *Nang*, or honor, is the pivotal concept for a Pashtun and is his standard of reference. “In the face of severe economic poverty, personal valour, marksmanship and skill in combat become the symbols that confer ‘nang’ and therefore status.”<sup>51</sup> Waziristan, such a *nang* society, differs from even its neighboring agencies in the way society and economy are organized; therefore, it is important to analyze each agency in its own context.

This study is important because there is a dearth of research that sheds light on Waziristan in both a historical and contemporary context. In the media, there is meager analysis of history and academic literature. In the academic arena, firstly, there is sparse work on Waziristan and little emphasis has been placed on field work, given the harsh climate and inaccessibility of the region. Secondly, there is very little literature that sheds light on the current conflict and examines the “big picture.” There is a strong need for a thorough analysis of the economic and social situation of Waziristan and to examine all the different factors in the conflict under one umbrella. In light of the current situation, it is important to see what impact the economic situation and the flow of aid has had on the region. At the same time, tackling women’s issues is not an easy task, given the shortage of literature. However, it is

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<sup>50</sup> Ahmed, *Millenium and Charisma Among Pathans*, 75.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 76.

important to understand their position in contemporary society as women are often one of the first victims of war.

#### IV. The Conflict Trap

The Uppsala Conflict Database Project defines a civil war as one in which there are at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in one year. An active conflict as one in which there are at least 25 battle-related deaths per conflict year; an armed conflict concerns two parties of which at least one is a government or state.<sup>52</sup> Collier and his colleagues argue that civil war differs from communal violence in that it involves a rebel organization that is armed and has full-time recruits. There is scanty data available on the number of conflict-related deaths in Waziristan and government statistics are estimates, often understated at best. A paper commissioned by an independent, non-profit organization (NGO) called Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILAT), and written by retired Brigadier Shaukat Qadir provides the following “guesstimate” of casualties in FATA:<sup>53</sup>

Security personnel dead: approximately 1,500.

Security personnel wounded: approximately 2,000.

Security personnel captured/surrendered: approximately 450.

Known militants dead: approximately 400.

Known militants wounded: approximately 700.

Civilians dead: approximately 1,500.

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<sup>52</sup> Uppsala Conflict Data Program, “UCDP Definitions,” UCDP, [http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/data\\_and\\_publications/definitions\\_all.htm](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/data_and_publications/definitions_all.htm).

<sup>53</sup> Shaukat Qadir, “A Military Perspective: Understanding Insurgency in FATA – II,” *Business Recorder*, February 23, 2008.

Civilians wounded: approximately 3,000.

While the conflict in Waziristan has not been defined as a “civil war” by either the media or the Government of Pakistan, the conflict could be categorized as one under Uppsala’s definitions. FATA is sufficiently isolated from the rest of the country that its impact has not been felt extensively throughout the state. But after years of fighting and breakdown of negotiations between the militants and the government, Pakistan is seeing the conflict filter through the mountains of Waziristan into the rest of the country in the form of suicide bombings and increasing violence among youth in urban cities like Peshawar.<sup>54</sup> According to Collier et al., the perpetrators of civil war usually adopt the rhetoric that war is necessary for social progress.<sup>55</sup> The pro-Taliban movement in Pakistan has not only taken an anti-American stance, it also wants to instill a more rigid Islamic law and has denounced President Musharraf for “Westernizing” the country and moving it away from *shariah*, the Islamic law.

Collier and his colleagues, based on extensive analysis of time series and cross-sectional data, argue that once a country stumbles into conflict, its risk of further conflict soars, and that the chief legacy of a civil war is another civil war.

Conflict weakens the economy and leaves a legacy of atrocities. It also creates leaders and organizations that have invested in skills and equipment that are only useful for violence. Disturbingly, while the overwhelming majority of the population in the country affected by civil war suffers from it, the leaders of

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<sup>54</sup> A recent example of militarization is the case of “Lal Masjid” (Red Mosque), in which hardline Islamic students, many from Waziristan, stormed a nearby children’s library and began a campaign of imposing *shariah* law and cleansing Islamabad of what they considered “non-Islamic” activities. When the government of Pakistan took actions against the group, the students barricaded themselves inside the mosque, resulting in a bloody clash between the two groups.

<sup>55</sup> Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap*, 11.



military organizations that are actually perpetuating the violence often do well out of it.<sup>56</sup>

As our analysis of the conflict in Waziristan will show, the groups who are suffering most are the marginalized groups, such as elders, children and women. Many children in the region have grown up in refugee camps and are a product of the Soviet-Afghan war, Afghanistan civil wars, the Taliban regime and the U.S. invasion of that country. This has left a legacy of hatred and remorse, and has had a severe impact not only on the social climate of northwest Pakistan but also the psychology of children. *Madrassahs*, religious schools, have grown rapidly and although not all of them preach violence, many teach a more radical interpretation of the Qu'ran and encourage anti-state and anti-U.S. activities.

At the same time, the leaders of the rebellion have profited from the drug trade from Afghanistan, which reached a record high in 2007 and accounted for 93 percent of the world's opium output.<sup>57</sup> Pakistan is the main transit route for drugs from Afghanistan and the FATA region itself has the largest harvest of opium in Pakistan.<sup>58</sup> However, drug cultivation in FATA actually declined by 51 percent from 2003 to 2007; the bulk of opium cultivated in Pakistan is in the Khyber Agency, and it is estimated to be around 1.2 percent of the area cultivated in Afghanistan.<sup>59</sup> The main source of revenues for militants is drug trade from Afghanistan, which is concentrated in the hands of the top violence entrepreneurs. Revenue from drug trade

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>57</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Illicit Drug Trends of Afghan Opiates*, (Kabul: The Paris Pact Initiative, 2008), 6.

<sup>58</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Illicit Drug Trends in Pakistan*, (Islamabad, The Paris Pact Initiative, 2008), 6.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 8.

has not transformed into better living conditions for the general population or helped the infrastructure in FATA.

Collier et al. argue that economic development is central to reducing conflict, and aid has substantial potential for conflict prevention if it is managed correctly.<sup>60</sup> The FATA region is lagging considerably behind the rest of the country in terms of economic development measures. Schools are few and far between, and with few options for parents to educate their children, *madrassahs* have flourished. Education for women is discouraged by the locals; hence, the government has left the subject alone and has not implemented any projects to raise awareness about the importance of education. Aid, especially from the U.S., has increased considerably since 2002, but, as Chapter Three will discuss in more detail, it has thus far not reached the barren hills of Waziristan and has done little in the tribal areas to curb the growth of the conflict. It remains to be seen whether the increase in aid and related activities will help reduce the conflict. So far, it is being used mostly for military build-up and for combat support and the Pakistani military has not had much luck in gaining the support of the tribes or rooting out what they consider “terrorists.”

The costs of a civil war are many – economic, social and political. This thesis will explore the impact of the conflict on women, who most often end up being the biggest victims of human rights violations in such cases. Additionally, the paper will analyze the implications of Collier and his colleagues’ conflict trap theory on the conflict in Waziristan.

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<sup>60</sup> Paul Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap*, 6,-8.

## V. Tribe and State

This thesis will adopt Ahmed's definition of tribes - a group having a common territory, common name, common language, common culture, common descent, common religious belief and some form of political organization. He defines a Pashtun as one who can trace his lineage through the father's line to one of the Pashtun tribes, and in turn to the apical ancestor. Pashtun tribal society "is not a stage in a typological sequence, band-tribe-chiefdom-state, but in its exclusive core *nang* areas, it presents a discrete self-sufficient socio-cultural category that has successfully perpetuated itself over centuries, while simultaneously exhibiting various complex forms in other areas as a result of changing economic and political situation."<sup>61</sup> This is evident in the case of Waziristan, from where men have migrated to other cities, be it Peshawar, Karachi or Dubai, to find livelihoods. The core society in Waziristan has evolved distinctly from the rest of the country under its own code of *Pukhtunwali*.

The Wazirs and Mahsuds have been defined by historians as an egalitarian society in which no one man holds more authority than another.<sup>62</sup> Ahmed stated: "The saying, 'every man is a malik unto himself' is understood literally in the tribal areas."<sup>63</sup> It is, however, a class-based society, and the more influential men and those who control trade are the richest.

There are numerous definitions of a state in various academic disciplines. For the purpose of this research, a state will be defined as a set of political institutions

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<sup>61</sup> Ahmed, *Pukhtun Economy and Society*, 84.

<sup>62</sup> The egalitarian nature of the tribes is debatable, given that *maliks* and some tribal elders hold more influence than others. Similarly, Taliban-style violence entrepreneurs have possessed leadership and destabilized the traditional tribal structure.

<sup>63</sup> Ahmed, *Resistance and Control in Pakistan*, 23.

with the concept of legal authority and a set of laws enforced by a governing group.<sup>64</sup> The idea of Pakistan as a “state” has been debated by many, especially in light of the current separatist movements that have been gaining momentum in various regions of the country.

As discussed, the FATA region presents an unusual situation because while officially it is part of the state of Pakistan, it is not subject to the country’s laws and regulations and even presidents have exercised authority over the region cautiously. While international institutions have been urging the Government of Pakistan to change these laws, doing so may not be easy because the Pashtuns value their independence greatly. At the same time, the government is afraid that calls for an independent “Pukhtunistan” that emerged after the creation of Pakistan in 1947 may be revived. The Awami National Party, the Pashtun nationalist political party, won an overwhelming majority in the NWFP in the national elections held in February, ousting the Islamist parties that gained control in 2002.

Separatist demands by Pashtun national groups have been based on the view that geographically and historically, NWFP was always distinct from the rest of South Asia; physically, culturally and linguistically, Pashtuns are different from other Pakistanis and have had less representation in the government and army, which is dominated by Punjabis.<sup>65</sup> But in the *nang* areas, the government of Pakistan kept its involvement minimal, until 2002, when it began combat operations to oust Taliban

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<sup>64</sup> Fred M. Donner, “The Formation of the Islamic State,” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 106, no. 2 (April-June 1986): 283.

<sup>65</sup> Adeel Khan, *Politics of Identity: Ethnic Nationalism and the State in Pakistan*, (New Delhi: Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd, 2005), 99

sympathizers attacking North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces across the border in Afghanistan and vying to establish an Islamic republic in the tribal areas.

#### VI. Conflict Actors

“As I traveled through Pakistan and particularly the Pashtun lands bordering Afghanistan, I felt as if I were moving through a Taliban spa for rehabilitation and inspiration,” wrote one *New York Times* journalist.<sup>66</sup> It is difficult to pinpoint one militant movement and to distinguish the pro-Taliban militants from the actual Taliban. According to some, the Taliban title was only inherited from the press.

The media began to call them (the militants) Taliban and Al-Qaeda, which they were not, but they accepted the titles with pride because, from being hated, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda suddenly became the symbol of those resisting the all-powerful US. Today, undoubtedly most of them have become Taliban and many certainly have Al-Qaeda connections, though that is not how they started.<sup>67</sup>

However, like the Taliban that ruled Afghanistan in the 1990s, these local groups have also drawn on “tribal” solidarity, and fortified their movement by a revivalist style of Islam that emerges from the periphery to take control of an existing state.<sup>68</sup> Initially, the Pakistani government focused on ousting the “foreign Taliban,” which not only included Afghans, but also Uzbeks, Chechens and even Uighurs who came to wage *jihad* first against the Soviet Union and then the U.S. Waziristan served as the main transit point for Taliban, Arabs and other foreign fighters escaping U.S.

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<sup>66</sup> Elizabeth Rubin, “In the Land of the Taliban,” *The New York Times Magazine*, October 22, 2006, [http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/22/magazine/22afghanistan.html?\\_r=2&scp=10&sq=drugs+and+pakistan&st=nyt&oref=slogin&oref=slogin](http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/22/magazine/22afghanistan.html?_r=2&scp=10&sq=drugs+and+pakistan&st=nyt&oref=slogin&oref=slogin).

<sup>67</sup> Qadir, “A Military Perspective: Understanding Insurgency in FATA – II.”

<sup>68</sup> Beattie, *Imperial Frontier*, 214.

military operations in Afghanistan.<sup>69</sup> The foreigners found refuge in these areas under the code of hospitality following the U.S. invasion in 2001. Many of them were absorbed into local tribes through marriage with local women. Now, the focus has shifted away from these foreigners to local militants, many of whom have spawned their own organizations. The popularity of the local Taliban has been defined by military experts:

Fiercely independent, the Pashtuns have always defended their homeland against foreign interlopers. No outside power has ever been able to subdue them completely. They defeated most of their would-be conquerors outright or absorbed them into their tribes through the centuries. The Pashtuns adapted to the military strategies of their invaders, and then utilized their new tactics and equipment to fight among themselves until confronted by another external threat. This military orientation has shaped the Pashtun – and Taliban – outlook: “*A Pashtun is never at peace, except when he is at war.*” The Pashtuns are inclined not to accept any form of strict authority, even at the cost of discord and insecurity.<sup>70</sup>

The umbrella group of the militant organizations is “Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,” the Pakistani Taliban Movement. It did not merge with the organizational structure of the Afghan Taliban under Mullah Omar, but developed its own distinct identity and was accepted as a legitimate voice in North and South Waziristan agencies.<sup>71</sup> It established itself as an alternate leadership to the traditional tribal elder structure, and thus far, has killed more than 200 tribal elders who it regarded as Pakistani or U.S. spies.<sup>72</sup> The leader of the group is Baitullah Mehsud, who created the organization in December 2007 and was accused by the Pakistani government of

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<sup>69</sup> Ilyas M Khan, “Pakistan Army’s Tribal Quagmire,” *BBC News*, October 9, 2007, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/7036032.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7036032.stm).

<sup>70</sup> Shahid Afsar, Chris Samples and Thomas Wood, “The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis,” *Military Review*, May-June 2008: 59.

<sup>71</sup> Hassan Abbas, “A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,” *CTC Sentinel* 1, no. 2 (January 2008): 2.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*

assassinating former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Mehsud has been blamed for many of the 56 suicide bombings in Pakistan and is reported to have command of some 20,000 fighters.<sup>73</sup> Another organization, “Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi,” TSNM, or Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic laws,” has also been a thorn in the government’s side.<sup>74</sup> Its founder and leader, Sufi Mohammad, was jailed in 2002<sup>75</sup> and the organization was banned, but its new leader Maulana Fazalullah has expanded the group’s activities.<sup>76</sup> TSNM, another pro-Taliban group, took control of several towns and villages in the NWFP, including the picturesque valley of Swat, and tried to implement strict *shariah* law. The group stems from the Malakand agency in FATA but has alliances all over the Frontier region. Al-Qaeda’s surviving leadership, including Osama bin Laden and Ayman-al-Zawahiri, is also suspected by the U.S. to be hiding in Pakistan’s tribal areas, which makes it even more critical in the “war on terror.”<sup>77</sup> Several other smaller anti-government groups have emerged, but details on many of these organizations are unclear.

The youth movement is dismantling the tribal structure that has existed for centuries. They are aiming to replace the *jirgas* with Islamic courts that impose a much stricter version of the *shariah*, although in many parts of Waziristan, *jirgas* are still held. Elders, which once commanded power and the tribes’ respects, are being

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<sup>73</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>74</sup> “Pakistan Militant ‘Holds to Deal,’” *BBC News*, May 24, 2008, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/7418284.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7418284.stm).

<sup>75</sup> Sufi Mohammad was released by the Government of Pakistan in May, 2008 as part of a reconciliation process with the militants.

<sup>76</sup> Hassan Abbas, “The Black-Turbaned Brigade: The Rise of TSNM in Pakistan,” *Terrorism Monitor*, *The Jamestown Foundation* 4, no. 23 (November, 30, 2006): 3.

<sup>77</sup> David Rohde, “Al Qaeda Finds its Center of Gravity,” *The New York Times*, September 10, 2006, [http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/10/weekinreview/10rohde.html?\\_r=1&oref=slogin](http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/10/weekinreview/10rohde.html?_r=1&oref=slogin).

condemned for supporting the Pakistani military.<sup>78</sup> The home-grown youth movement has employed the same rhetoric that was used by their predecessors to rally tribes against the British. However, armed with modern weaponry and skilled fighters, the violence entrepreneurs in the current conflict have refused to back down or enter into agreements with the Government of Pakistan.

The groups probably most impacted in this conflict are the elders, children and women in the tribes. The citizens of FATA maintained good relations with Pakistan's government as long as they were allowed their autonomy, and most tribes pledged allegiance to the country while condemning anti-Pakistan/Afghan propaganda; the tribes remained in relative peace until the late 1970s upheaval in Afghanistan.<sup>79</sup> However, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the Pakistan Army's subsequent incursion into the tribal areas caused deep resentment among the locals. The tribes initially sympathized with the Taliban, who were also ethnically Pashtun, and harbored many who fled Afghanistan in the wake of the U.S. attacks. But with militant activity growing, the "Talibanization" of FATA has becoming a threat to the traditional tribal societal structure. Existing tribal customs that have existed for centuries in these areas are being undermined by the young militants who are also from the tribes but are vying to establish a system of hierarchy in which they have the ultimate power. The tribesmen who have not sided with the Taliban, especially in Waziristan, have been forced to side with violence entrepreneurs for fear

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<sup>78</sup> David Montero, "Elders Losing to Extremists in Pakistan," *Christian Science Monitor*, June 8, 2006, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0608/p06s01-wosc.html.html>.

<sup>79</sup> Quraishi, "Pakhtunistan," 108.



of losing their own lives. They have received little support from the government, whose activities in the region are mainly limited to military affairs. The Government of Pakistan says it is difficult to distinguish the militants from peaceful tribesmen because the former hail from the tribes themselves. Many locals have been forced to leave their homes for other areas, creating a throng of internally displaced people in the tribal belt.

There are several other key actors involved in this conflict. A top player is the U.S., which has a heavily vested interest in the region because of its rebuilding efforts in Afghanistan. One of the U.S.' top foreign policy goals is to support "geostrategic" interests in Pakistan and combat the global threat of terrorism. To achieve this, the U.S. has ramped up aid to Pakistan and is pressuring the country to produce results against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. To continue developing Afghanistan, U.S. lawmakers have considered that it is in the U.S. interest to support the Pakistani government and prevent militants from gaining a further foothold in FATA. According to writer Tariq Gilani, "Pakistan has become the U.S.' most trusted ally in the global war on terrorism... There is a perception that the renewed friendship is being driven solely by America's need for Pakistani cooperation in the 'War on Terrorism' and is dependent upon the continued presence and leadership of President Pervez Musharraf."<sup>80</sup> In a recent address, Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that militants in the tribal areas of Pakistan are a direct

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<sup>80</sup> Tariq Gilani, "US-Pakistan Relations: The Way Forward," *Parameters* 36, no. 4 (2006-2007): 85.

threat to U.S. and Western interests and that it will take between three to five years to completely quell the insurgency.<sup>81</sup>

The government and army of Pakistan are also chief players in this conflict. Since its inception, Pakistan had maintained relatively peaceful relations with FATA tribes. But amid growing violence in its northwest border and pressure from Washington to prevent Al-Qaeda from spreading, the Pakistani government deployed its military to FATA for the first time ever in 2002 to fight against an alliance between foreign Taliban supporters who fled Afghanistan in the wake of the U.S. invasion and their allies in the tribes. In recent years, the government has deployed more than 90,000 troops in the tribal areas.<sup>82</sup> Seeing that the military buildup only fuelled resentment and caused widespread flight of people from their homes, the government reached accords with the violence entrepreneurs in April 2004 in South Waziristan and on 5 September 2006 in North Waziristan.<sup>83</sup>

Thus far, the Government of Pakistan has had an inconsistent strategy and incoherent policies in dealing with the conflict in the tribal areas. It tried negotiating with violence entrepreneurs on several occasions, but when that failed, they resent the army to the tribal areas again, only to withdraw it a few months later and start talks again. This process has been repeated several times since 2002 and even the new government that was installed in February 2008 has had little luck in devising a consistent strategy.

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<sup>81</sup> Anwar Iqbal, "Fata Militants Pose Direct Threat to US," *Dawn*, May 2, 2008, <http://www.dawn.com/2008/05/03/top6.htm>.

<sup>82</sup> Khan, "Pakistan Army's Tribal Quagmire."

<sup>83</sup> The Crisis Group, *Pakistan's Tribal Areas*, 6.

The Government of Pakistan is facing a monumental challenge in curbing the spread of Taliban ideologies in the country, which has spread beyond the FATA to the NWFP. As a local journalist said, “Talibanization is seeping out of the tribal areas and spreading like a jungle fire.”<sup>84</sup> Even in the capital of Islamabad, the rise of conservative *mullahs*, or religious leaders, has threatened to create disorder among rival parties. The new government, which came into power in February 2008, has vowed to negotiate with the militants, but attempts at talks have failed and rebellions in FATA continue to flourish.

Another party in this conflict is Afghanistan. President Karzai’s regime has criticized Pakistan for not doing enough to stop cross-border attacks that are being launched against the NATO forces and the Afghan army by militants in Pakistan. On the other hand, Musharraf has accused the Afghan government for “not doing anything to fight terrorism,” letting militants flee into Pakistan and “losing the fight against Taliban.”<sup>85</sup>

Other players in this conflict include sellers/purchasers of weapons, including non-state actors such as criminal gangs, and tribal landlords and businessmen, many of whom buy weapons in bulk, as well as law-enforcement agents. Women have also been impacted heavily by this conflict, as Chapter Four will show.

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<sup>84</sup> Ibid., 24.

<sup>85</sup> *Daily Times*, “Musharraf Expects Re-election Before Polls,” April 27, 2007, [http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C04%5C27%5Cstory\\_27-4-2007\\_pg1\\_7](http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C04%5C27%5Cstory_27-4-2007_pg1_7).

## **Chapter Two**

### **From Past to Present**

*“History is certainly being made in this corridor  
(Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier) still and I am sure  
a great deal more history is going to be made there in  
the near future – perhaps in a rather unpleasant way...”*

Arnold Toynbee, English Historian, 1961<sup>86</sup>

The British provided some of the most accurate and detailed accounts of the tribes, yet contemporary authors have argued that their sketches were tainted with stereotypes. This chapter will analyze the people of Waziristan and greater FATA as viewed through the eyes of the British, and shed light on contemporary events against the backdrop of colonial history.

#### *I. Noble Savages*<sup>87</sup>

FATA tribes had a tumultuous, love-hate relationship with the British. Images of the brute tribesmen were portrayed next to romantic descriptions of the unchartered tribal territories and their handsome yet vicious warrior tribesmen. In reality, the region was the scene of the greatest military conflicts of the closing years of the Raj.<sup>88</sup> Even as late as the 1930s, there were as many British troops in Waziristan as in the rest of the Indian subcontinent.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Arnold Toynbee, “Impressions of Afghanistan and Pakistan’s North-West Frontier: In Relation to the Communist World,” *International Affairs* 37, no. 2 (April 1961): 161.

<sup>87</sup> Theodore L. Pennell, “Among the Wild Tribes of the Afghan Frontier,” (London: Seeley, 1909), quoted in Andre Singer, *Lords of the Khyber: The Story of the North-West Frontier*, (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1984), 19.

<sup>88</sup> Alan Warren, *Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi, and the Indian Army: The North West Frontier Revolt of 1936-37*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 324.

<sup>89</sup> Ahmed, *Millenium and Charisma Among Pathans*, 118.



Table 2– Historical Timeline

<b>Years</b>	<b>Event</b>
1839-42	First Anglo-Afghan war
1849	British capture Peshawar
1857	Mutiny in tribal areas
1872	British introduce the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR)
1878-82	Second Anglo-Afghan war
1893-96	Creation of the Durand Line
1895	North and South Waziristan Agencies established
1897-98	Frontier War/The Great Tribal Uprising
1901	North-West Frontier Province Created
1914-18	World War I
1919	Third Anglo-Afghan war; Afghanistan creates its first Constitution
1939-45	World War II
1945	Sir Olaf Caroe becomes last governor of NWFP
1947	Partition; Pakistan and India created
1979	Soviet Union invades Afghanistan
1989	Soviet Union withdraws from Afghanistan; Beginning of Afghan civil war
1990 Onward	Taliban consolidate their power
1991	Collapse of the Soviet Union
2001	U.S. invades Afghanistan to oust the Taliban with the help of Northern Alliance

Pakistan's tribal areas have been subject to many empires, "perhaps more invasions in the course of history than any other country in Asia, or indeed the world."<sup>91</sup> The present territory of the NWFP was first formed as part of the Ghaznavid Dynasty in 977; in 1179, Muhammad of Ghor captured the area and was subsequently overthrown by the Mongols in 1221. However, several areas in the tribal territories remained independent and the Mongols did not succeed in crossing the Indus River to overtake India.<sup>92</sup> The nature of the Mongols' dealings with the tribe is not clear, and they remained on hostile terms with Indian emperors for most of their reign. According to historians, the Frontier tribes never accepted any sole central authority; in fact, each acceptance of the ruling authority – whether it was the Mughals or the British – was only for strategic, self-serving purposes. "No empire of which we have any record has ever succeeded in making subjects of the tribes of Waziristan," said Sir Olaf Caroe, Britain's last governor of the NWFP and a key actor in the final years of the Empire.

The British arrived in Peshawar, now the capital of the NWFP, in 1849, ending the unsuccessful and ruthless Sikh rule started by Maharaja Ranjit Singh and beginning their long, difficult journey with the Pashtuns. Dealing with the Pashtuns was not an easy task.

The conditions were extraordinarily difficult. In the first place there was no tradition of any really firm order even in the plains, at least since Mughal times; in the neighbouring highlands there had never been any control. Secondly there was no exact limit, such as that provided by a stable State up

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<sup>91</sup> Caroe, *The Pathans*, 25.

<sup>92</sup> *Imperial Gazetteer of India: North-West Frontier Province*, (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1979), 15-16.

to which, and no further, the new authority could run. Thirdly, and this was certainly not adequately appreciated at the time, the Pathans were from almost every point of view, ethnic, linguistic, geographical, historical, different even from the Muslims of Punjab.<sup>93</sup>

An array of unknown Pashtun tribes were spread across unexplored terrain; to control them fully would have required even more military might than even that possessed by current governments, according to historian Hugh Beattie.<sup>94</sup>

Additionally, there was no set frontier boundary between the British territory and the Afghan Kingdom of Dost Muhammad Khan; in fact, the tribal territory beyond British control was known as *ghairilaaqa*, un-administered territory (a title which still applies today), or *Yaghistan*, the land of rebels,<sup>95</sup> where the people were “armed to the teeth and were the most notorious raiders and plunderers in history.”<sup>96</sup>

Afghanistan claimed authority over the passages between the two lands.<sup>97</sup>

For the first twenty years, the British implemented the “Close Border Policy,” a policy of non-interference which involved minimal intervention in the tribal areas. Many in the Raj believed that the Indus River formed the northwest frontier of the Empire, hence deeming it unnecessary to directly deal with the tribes. Furthermore, they eliminated custom duties on the Frontier to encourage the tribes to trade in India.<sup>98</sup> Even so, Caroe estimated that there were at least eleven military operations in the twenty years after the Indian Mutiny of 1855-57, and twelve expeditions from 1877 to 1881 (See Appendix 1).

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<sup>93</sup> Caroe, *The Pathans*, 346.

<sup>94</sup> Beattie, *Imperial Frontier*, 24.

<sup>95</sup> Also translated as “Land of freedom or unrestraint.”

<sup>96</sup> Caroe, *The Pathans*, 347-348.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> Beattie, *Imperial Frontier*, 25.



Following the second Anglo-Afghan War of 1878-80, the British realized they needed direct relations with the tribes to enhance their own security measures in the main passes that led to Afghanistan.<sup>99</sup> Hence, the 1890s marked the beginning of the “Forward Policy” and the end of “masterly inactivity.”<sup>100</sup> Although the British had been successful in many cases in dealing with the tribes through military might, they realized that expeditions alone would not produce any lasting results and that there was a need for a more conciliatory policy.<sup>101</sup> The shift in policy divided British lawmakers, with one side believing that the least possible advances into the Frontier would be helpful to the British and the other side thinking that an active policy in the tribal areas would prevent any Russian onslaught. Eventually, the two sides reconciled and decided that the best way to stop the steady advance of Russia towards British India was by building a friendly, united Afghanistan to serve as a buffer state.

Attempts were made throughout the British rule to form a closer alliance with the Amir of Afghanistan by gift-giving and providing ammunition.<sup>102</sup> The relationship between the British and Afghan leaders was erratic, and the problem of tribal control continued well until the British departed India. Settlement of tribal affairs in Waziristan was probably the most “thorny problem” for British lawmakers.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> D.P. Singhal, *India and Afghanistan 1876-1907: A Study in Diplomatic Relations*, (Queensland, Australia: University of Queensland Press, 1963), 142.

<sup>100</sup> H.H. Dodwell, ed., *The Cambridge History of India*, vol. VI, *The Indian Empire 1858-1918*, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1932), 456.

<sup>101</sup> C. Collin Davies, *The Problem of the North-West Frontier: 1890-1908*, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1932), 77.

<sup>102</sup> *The Cambridge History of India*, 460.

<sup>103</sup> Davies, *The Problem of the North-West Frontier*, 88.

To secure their legitimacy, the British started a system of allowances (*muwajib*). Under these written agreements, *maliks* from every tribe were paid an allowance in return for a guarantee of border security, control of raiders and general good behavior. The controversial allowance system came under fire as being a form of blackmail and for creating rifts in an egalitarian society by giving corrupt *maliks* stipends but many British strategists and Caroe defended it, saying that since the tribes were not direct subjects of the British Empire or their legal codes, this was a way to keep them from raiding the more settled tribes in the plains.<sup>104</sup> “Making particular tribes responsible for the security of particular routes into the hills (in exchange for allowances), known by the British as ‘pass responsibility,’ was an important frontier management technique.”<sup>105</sup> If they did not keep their promises, the British punished the tribes with economic blockades, prisoners/hostages, property seizure and military expeditions. Additionally, the British often took advantage of intra-tribal rivalry to pit one tribe against the other.

In 1872, the British introduced the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), which authorized tribes to settle their disputes through the traditional *jirga*. For the British, it was also important to distinguish the boundary between their territory and the Afghans, which led to the creation of the Durand Line, named after Sir Mortimer Durand who was in charge of the delineation project. “The dissenting members recognized that the Durand Agreement had introduced a new factor into the already

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<sup>104</sup> Caroe, *The Pathans*, 349.

<sup>105</sup> Beattie, *Imperial Frontier*, 34.

vexed cauldron of border politics, but held that in course of time it would tend to a peaceful solution of the frontier problem.”<sup>106</sup>

Following the creation of the Durand Line in 1893, the frontier tribal belt came under direct control of the British. While the demarcation process was begun by Sir Mortimer Durand, he was posted to Iran soon after and did not stay in India to see its completion. It took three years for the British to establish a full north-south border, thanks to interruptions by the Amir of Afghanistan and difficulties in accessing the tribal areas. The difficult of the demarcation process, which took several years, is well expressed in a narrative by Sir Mortimer Durand:

Once I said to him (Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan): ‘After all, Amir Sahib, if there is so little population and wealth in the country you describe (the tribal areas), what good will it do you?’ His answer was one word. He turned upon me slowly with a very steady look into my eyes, and said: ‘*Nam*,’ (honour). On such points he was inflexible.<sup>107</sup>

“There was no longer a no-man’s-land of uncertain extent, and both authorities could now think and act with greater precision.”<sup>108</sup> Despite the delineation, an “ethnological monstrosity,”<sup>109</sup> the British were careful not to impose their own administrative laws on the tribes. For the most part, they left tribal customs and rights intact.<sup>110</sup> Nevertheless, “all this was regarded as a deliberate menace to a long-

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<sup>106</sup> Davies, *The Problem of the North-West Frontier*, 90.

<sup>107</sup> Gerald De Gaury and H.V.F. Winstone, *The Road to Kabul: An Anthology*, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1982), 219.

<sup>108</sup> Caroe, *The Pathans*, 382.

<sup>109</sup> Arnold Fletcher, *Afghanistan Highway of Conquest*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1965), 248.

<sup>110</sup> Many historians argue that maybe if the British had completely smashed the tribal structure, they potentially would have solved the Frontier problem forever. See Davies, *The Problem of the North-West Frontier*, 187.

cherished independence,”<sup>111</sup> resulting in the war of 1897 that started in a Wazir village. After all, it was the first time that the Pashtun tribes were divided between Afghanistan and the Raj. “Demarcation dictated by political expediency and not by scientific considerations was naturally to culminate in an uprising of the resentful tribes inhabiting the disputed area.”<sup>112</sup> The border was formed without tribal consultation and divided Pashtun tribes between Afghanistan and Britain; for example, the border cut the Mohmand tribal area into two separate parts and to this day, many tribes refuse to acknowledge the division.

Some historians contend that the Durand Line and the agreement between the Amir and the British to divide the region was not particularly helpful to the latter.

Frontier history, since 1893, shows that this agreement has not only increased the responsibilities of the Government of India, but has also increased the chances of collision with the tribes and of war with the amir. The new boundary was not based upon sound topographical data, for, during the process of demarcation, it was discovered that certain places, marked on the Durand map, did not exist on the actual ground. Many ethnic absurdities were perpetrated, such as the handing over to the amir of the Birmal tract of Waziristan, peopled by Derwesh Khel Waziris, the majority of whom were included within the British sphere of influence.<sup>113</sup>

British frontier policy had two objectives: One to secure the best possible position from which to repel an overland attack by a European power (France, at first, then Russia); second to secure life and property against tribal raiders and outlaws sheltered by them.<sup>114</sup> According to G.C.S. Curtis, who served as political agent in the South Waziristan Agency from 1943 to 1946, the first imperial object was achieved

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<sup>111</sup> Caroe, *The Pathans*, 382.

<sup>112</sup> Singhal, *India and Afghanistan*, 180.

<sup>113</sup> *The Cambridge History of India*, 462.

<sup>114</sup> Gerald Colville Seymore Curtis, “Notes on Service in India 1939-47,” memoir, MSS Eur. F.180/58, Indian Civil Service Collection, India Office Library, British Library, London.

but there was only partial success for the second domestic goal, mainly because the tribes had never known what it was like to be governed. “Here, if anywhere in the world, was to be found the dictatorship of the proletariat expressed, not in the tyranny of the few, but in the license of many... Such society bred a turbulent and predatory attitude to life which made it an uncomfortable neighbour.”<sup>115</sup> It was difficult to control arms smuggling from Afghanistan and to appease the tribes in every way, and hence made full conquest of the tribes difficult.

According to historian Hugh Beattie, British imperial policy had four influences. Firstly, tribal territory was part of a critical frontier that, for the Raj, served as the boundary between them and the Russians; secondly, decisions had to be made about how much the government would spend in administrative, financial and military resources; thirdly, frontier policy had an ideological dimension, which meant that policies were impacted by personal beliefs; fourthly, the British had to resolve sociological ideas about how tribes “worked.”<sup>116</sup>

Caroe likened the Mahsud to a “wolf... more purposeful, more united and more dangerous” and the Wazir to a “panther... slier, sleeker, and has more grace.”<sup>117</sup> The Mahsuds were a constant sore point in the British scheme, indiscriminately carrying out raids, killings and kidnappings. The Mahsuds of central Waziristan were particularly rebellious, followed by the Wazirs.<sup>118</sup> “Of all the Pathan tribes up and down the North-West Frontier, the Mahsuds were without question the most

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<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

<sup>116</sup> Beattie, *Imperial Frontier*, 161.

<sup>117</sup> Caroe, *The Pathans*, 393.

<sup>118</sup> Charles C. Trench, *The Frontier Scouts*, (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1985), 6.

intransigent.”<sup>119</sup> G.C.S Curtis wrote that Mahsuds murdered more British officers than any other tribe.<sup>120</sup> “The Mahsud and other tribesmen were convinced of the superiority of their society to the only two societies of which they had any knowledge, Afghanistan and India.”<sup>121</sup> Afghan interference made matters even worse. The Government of Afghanistan provided fodder to the tribes for continual agitation, including financial and emotional support, against the British, and gave asylum to outlaws and bandits.<sup>122</sup> These “Afghan allowance holders” were the chief stirrers of rebellions.<sup>123</sup> Another group that often agitated the British were the *mullahs*, religious leaders, whose importance will be discussed in further detail later on in this chapter.

Many scholars have argued that the tribes could not stand rule by non-Muslims, but Caroe argued that it was not religious impulse but the urge “to resist subjection and to preserve their own peculiar way of life”<sup>124</sup> that drove Mahsuds to such actions. In fact, according to Caroe, a tribesman was a Mahsud first and then a Muslim,<sup>125</sup> a notion that has been argued by many contemporary scholars.

Over time, the British decided that the best way to deal with the tribes was through indirect rule; imposing centralized administration on them would only invite resistance.<sup>126</sup> A Political Agent, aided by a large cabinet of British and local tribesmen, was posted in each agency to serve as a “go-between;” he was an advisor

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<sup>119</sup> Caroe, *The Pathans*, 397.

<sup>120</sup> Gerald Colville Seymore Curtis, “Notes on Service in India 1939-47,” memoir.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid.

<sup>122</sup> Caroe, *The Pathans*, 397.

<sup>123</sup> Gerald Colville Seymore Curtis, “Notes on Service in India 1939-47,” memoir.

<sup>124</sup> Caroe, *The Pathans*, 397.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

<sup>126</sup> Brobst, *The New Great Game*, 101.

to the tribes, the army and the administration and prevented feuds and raiding.<sup>127</sup>

Many British Political Agents carried hopes of introducing “civilization” to the tribal areas, and thought that one day the tribes would recognize the graciousness of the British Empire and be drawn to modernization, like the rest of the Indian empire. But even when relations between the two parties were amicable, Pashtuns never aspired to be like the British. “Although they sometimes formed good relationships with individual officers, it appears that they did not particularly admire the model of civilisation the British offered with its emphasis on status, hierarchy and obedience to authority.”<sup>128</sup> In contrast, they preferred more to “be men like our fathers before us.”<sup>129</sup>

Under Lord Curzon, viceroy of India, who took a keen interest in tribal affairs, the Frontier Corps were formed in 1900.<sup>130</sup> With fighters from every tribe, the scouts were responsible for the security of the Frontier. At the same time, the North and South Waziristan militias, or, as one historian dubs them, “poachers turned game-keepers,” were created for these agencies, which were considered to be the core of the Frontier problem.<sup>131</sup> The militia was controlled by the Political Agent and the Agency’s Chief Commissioner. Young recruits joined the corps for money and, to some extent, their love of fighting.<sup>132</sup> Nevertheless, of all the tribes, the Wazirs avoided service with the British, and the few Mahsuds who joined it were known for

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<sup>127</sup> Duncan Cameron Murray, “Notes on Service in India 1939-47,” memoir.

<sup>128</sup> Beattie, *Imperial Frontier*, 172.

<sup>129</sup> E.B. Howell, *Mizh: A Monograph on Government’s Relations with the Mahsud Tribe*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1979), Preface.

<sup>130</sup> Trench, *The Frontier Scouts*, 8.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*, 63.

desertion and rebellion.<sup>133</sup> The Frontier Corps continues to be an important tool of the Pakistani army, but despite their connections to the tribes, the Corps has met with little success in rooting out the terrorists that Pakistan and U.S. governments are after.

Even though they were not successful in integrating the tribes into the rest of the British Empire and uprisings continued to erupt, the Raj maintained a certain degree of control over the tribes and put considerable effort into learning about the Frontier. Only top British civil servants were posted to the frontier because of the difficulty of the post. Frontier officers were required to learn Pashto and local customs, and had to cultivate good relationships with influential men to get to know their district.<sup>134</sup> In contrast, many in the Pakistan and the U.S. governments that are involved in the conflict today are largely ignorant of the customs and traditions of the Pashtun people, which has hindered the “war on terror.” The British placed heavy emphasis on languages, but in the current crisis, there is a significant dearth of language and culture experts. Even before the beginning of the “war on terror,” a U.S. Senate subcommittee held a hearing on the “crisis in Federal Language capabilities” and acknowledged the shortfalls in language skills in U.S. peacekeeping missions.<sup>135</sup>

Upon partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, a plebiscite was held on the frontier and the tribes voted in favor of joining Pakistan. The North-West Frontier was heavily contested between the Indian Congress Party and the Muslim League, led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah. “Both Congress and League recognized its importance in

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<sup>133</sup> Ahmed, *Resistance and Control in Pakistan*, 28.

<sup>134</sup> Beattie, *Imperial Frontier*, 107.

<sup>135</sup> U.S. Senate Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, *Hearings: The State of Foreign Language Capabilities in National Security and the Federal Government*, 106<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> session., 2000, [http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2000\\_hr/hr\\_091400.html](http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2000_hr/hr_091400.html).



their policies; it was the acutest of all bones of contention between them.”<sup>136</sup> As the next section will show, the idea of “The Great Game” kept this region’s profile high even during and after partition.

## II. The Great Game

Coined by British officer Arthur Connolly around 1840 and later popularized by Rudyard Kipling in his book *Kim*, the “Great Game” described the nineteenth-century contest for mastery in Asia.<sup>137</sup> It described the struggle between Russia and Britain for the dominance of central Asia. Lord Curzon, the last viceroy of India, called it the “grand chessboard” on which the game for domination of the world was played.<sup>138</sup> It was not just a political but also an economic contest.

India, a prized possession in the British colonial empire, was carefully guarded by the British against one of its most powerful foes – Russia. “The British looked upon the Russian advance in Central Asia with apprehension principally because of their interests in India.”<sup>139</sup>

The tribal areas, situated between Afghanistan and India, were considered critical to the security of the rest of the Raj and to prevent an onslaught of the Russian Empire, which many British believed was bent on conquering the world and to drive the British out of India. “They (the tribes) are in a very special sense the door-keepers of the gates of India,”<sup>140</sup> wrote Caroe, a strategist of the Great Game. This was the

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<sup>136</sup> Olaf Caroe, “Letters to the governor of NWFP,” private papers, MSS Eur. F. 203, Caroe Collection, India Office Library, British Library, London.

<sup>137</sup> Brobst, *Future of the Great Game*, xiii.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid.

<sup>139</sup> Singhal, *India and Afghanistan*, 180.

<sup>140</sup> Olaf Caroe, “Letters to the governor of NWFP,” private papers,

“entrance where there may be more immediate trouble, because the people are much more difficult and it is possible for fifth column and other organizations to stir up trouble there rather than further south.”<sup>141</sup> Hence, it was important to secure the allegiance of the tribes not just for the defense of India, but also as a barrier against untrustworthy Afghanistan, part of the “ring fence” of the British Empire, a series of buffers circling from Burma to Persia.<sup>142</sup> As Caroe said, Afghanistan was “a place which has to be watched if the peace of Asia is to be preserved.”<sup>143</sup> The Great Game was a “clandestine war of wits and bribery and occasional military pressure as both powers kept each other at a respectful distance by maintaining Afghanistan as a buffer state between them.”<sup>144</sup> As the British stated in a report, “The ultimate aim of our North-West Frontier policy is the security of India.”<sup>145</sup> This obsession with the Great Game was what led the British to adopt the “Forward Policy” in its tribal agencies.

The Great Game continued even after the British left the subcontinent. In fact, it grew even more complicated, with the advent of air power, which deemed the Raj’s outer rings useless, regional unrest and the increasing involvement of the U.S.<sup>146</sup> Russia took over Central Asia and eventually roped itself into a protracted war in

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<sup>141</sup> Olaf Caroe, “The North-West Frontier,” lecture, 6 April 1949, MSS Eur. F.203/47, Caroe Papers, India Office Library, British Library, London.

<sup>142</sup> Brobst, *The New Great Game*, 36, 104.

<sup>143</sup> Caroe to Lydall, 5 November 1942, MSS Eur. D.923, Lydall Papers, India Office Library, British Library, London, quoted in John Brobst, *The Future of the Great Game*, 58.

<sup>144</sup> Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 11.

<sup>145</sup> James W. Spain, *The Pathan Borderland*, (The Hague, Netherlands: Mouton & Co., 1963), 123.

<sup>146</sup> Brobst, *The New Great Game*, 45.

Afghanistan, in which Pakistan's tribal areas played an important role, and for which Pakistan is now paying a heavy price.

Caroe warned that Afghanistan and the remote Pathan borderlands of what is today Pakistan formed a political fault zone of global significance. He anticipated the resilience of Islam in the face of communism and secularizing ideologies... The Great Game continues to drive the dynamic of global power and strategic competition in Asia today and presumably tomorrow.<sup>147</sup>

The U.S. undoubtedly has become involved in the "New" Great Game, and the Pashtun tribes continue to be in the spotlight. The U.S.' first foray into the region was during the Cold War, when it funded the *mujahideen* to fight against the Soviet Union. Today, the focus is on the "war on terrorism" and American policymakers have realized that to win this war, it will be important to gain the support of the Pakistani tribes, as well as the government and the general public, hence the generous flow of money to the country. Caroe expressed great cynicism about American involvement in his days, when the U.S. opposed colonial rule in South Asia.<sup>148</sup> "Caroe suggested that those in America who spoke the loudest about the moral urgency of India's independence sought in actuality a 'quid pro quo for land lease in the form of air and sea bases and markets for the sale of goods.'"<sup>149</sup>

While Caroe recognized the need for American partnership, he feared they had wrong ideas about Asian politics. "America professes to be certain that the Indian knot has only to be untied by a process of academic liberalism: she does not know

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<sup>147</sup> Ibid., xx.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid.

how complex is the pattern, or realise the danger of unweaving what is woven.”<sup>150</sup>

They would have to refine their thinking to play an effective position in the Great Game, he warned.

China is the new entrant into the Great Game. With its booming economy, a strong army and increasing ties with South Asian countries, China has taken center stage in world affairs. Caroe and his colleagues worried that China’s advancement southward might break India’s northern barriers.<sup>151</sup> China and India have fought a war over a disputed region on the Himalayan border, and have had several skirmishes along their borders. The two countries currently are trying to build and expand their trade relations, although India’s nuclear capability continues to irk China, which is investing heavily in projects in Pakistan as well as cementing its ties with the government of India.

The future of the Great Game is unclear, as several competing forces strive for dominance. One of Caroe’s predictions is coming true today: a divided and distracted India would shake global security and become an easy prey to power-hungry states.<sup>152</sup> This thesis will not go into the argument of whether the partition caused a regional divide. However, given the current circumstances, it is important to note that continued instability and ethnic cleavages in Pakistan, which is now at the center of the Great Game, could well breed ground for entrance of foreign military powers that could not only break the country, but impact the global state of terrorism. After the

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<sup>150</sup> Note by Caroe, 15 September 1944, IO L/P&S/12/724, India Office Library, British Library, London.


<sup>151</sup> Brobst, *The New Great Game*, 36.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid., 17.

partition, Caroe envisioned a united Pakistan as the eastern anchor in a “military crescent” of Islamic states allied against the Soviet Union.<sup>153</sup> While Pakistan did help arm and finance the Afghans against the Soviet Union, how its future pans out in the Great Game remains to be seen.

Journalist Ahmed Rashid postulates that the new Great Game is the “battle for the vast oil and gas riches of landlocked Central Asia,” in which Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Russia, Central Asian countries, Turkey and the U.S. play key roles.<sup>154</sup>

Figure 4 – British India’s Outer Buffer Ring



Source: Brobst, *The Future of the Great Game*, 2005.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid., 123.

<sup>154</sup> Rashid, *Taliban*, 5-6.

### III. God's Soldiers

Afghanistan has always been important for India when it comes to protecting itself externally. "Afghanistan and the intervening area had been from the earliest time an integral part of Indian history. Inability to regulate his relationship with the master of the Afghan area, or to fortify the border satisfactorily, had often in the past brought sorrow to many an Indian ruler (like the Mughals and the Marathas)."<sup>155</sup>

Since its inception, Pakistan has had an unsteady relationship with Afghanistan because of the Frontier border dispute. "They (the Pashtun) are one people, the Frontier itself being merely an expedient creation of this century."<sup>156</sup> So when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, it came as no surprise that the tribes and the Government of Pakistan financially, militarily, physically and emotionally supported the *mujahideen's jihad* (holy war) against the invaders, the former to fight the infidels and the latter to ensure a friendly government came to power. The tribes in Pakistan's northwest frontier played an essential role in harboring and training *mujahideen* warriors.

*Madrassahs*, funded generously by Saudis, sprang up along the frontier to educate and train the youth that were harbored in Pakistan. *Madrassahs* had always existed in Pakistan and provided education to poor families who could not afford to send their children to public schools. But in the 1980s, the curriculum of many such institutions change to a more radical teaching of the Qu'ran, which further promoted the ideology of the *mujahideen*. Ahmed Rashid argues that the military government

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<sup>155</sup> Singhal, *India and Afghanistan*, 180.

<sup>156</sup> Singer, *Lords of the Khyber*, 18.

of Zia ul Haq funded *madrassahs* precisely to increase radical Islamic education and to create more *Mujahideen* recruits. “In 1971, there were only 900 *madrassahs* in Pakistan, but by the end of the Zia era in 1988 there were 8,000 *madrassahs* and 25,000 unregistered ones, educating over half a million students.”<sup>157</sup>

The U.S. funneled arms to Pakistan’s highly-secretive Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency to strengthen their own position in the Cold War. The funds from all sides were exorbitant. Soviet Union pumped \$45 billion into Afghanistan to subdue the *mujahideen*; the U.S. funneled \$4-5 billion between 1980 and 1992 to the *mujahideen*, who received more than \$10 billion in aid from all over the world, mostly in the form of modern weaponry.<sup>158</sup>

Following the end of the Afghan-Soviet war in 1989, ideological differences between *mujahideen* groups resulted in a civil war, which eventually led to the rise of the Taliban.<sup>159</sup> There was no shortage of arms or fighters for this Pashtun group led by Mullah Muhammad Omer. Galvanizing the people under the banner of Islam and reviving Pashtun nationalism, the Taliban climbed to power after a brutal civil war. “They were to inspire a new extremist form of fundamentalism across Pakistan and Central Asia, which refused to compromise with traditional Islamic values, social structures, or existing state systems.”<sup>160</sup>

The Taliban’s training grounds were the refugee camps and *madrassahs* of Peshawar and Quetta.

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<sup>157</sup> Rashid, *Taliban*, 89.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid., 18.

<sup>159</sup> The word in Arabic is plural for *Talib*, which means student.

<sup>160</sup> Rashid, *Taliban*, 2.

Many of them had been born in Pakistan refugee camps, educated in Pakistani *madrassahs* and had learnt their fighting skills from Mujaheddin parties based in Pakistan. As such the younger Taliban barely knew their own country or history, but from their *madrassahs* they learnt about the ideal Islamic society created by the Prophet Mohammed 1,400 years ago and this is what they wanted to emulate.<sup>161</sup>

Pakistan, which initially supported the less radical Hezb-e-Islami (Party of Islam) led by Gulbuddin Hikmetyar, changed their support in favor of the Taliban when they realized Hikmetyar was not making any headway.

Afghanistan's *jihad* rallied Pakistani youth in Baluchistan and the NWFP, many of whom joined the Taliban movement themselves. Given Pakistan's staunch support of the Taliban, there was a free flow of movement in the already-porous border. Although the U.S. government officially denied support to the Taliban, they did little to oppose their policies. With Unocal competing for a stake in a possible South Asia natural gas pipeline that would connect the resource-rich Central Asian markets to the world and bypass Russia, there was initially little public condemnation of the Taliban. "The Clinton administration was clearly sympathetic to the Taliban, as they were in line with Washington's anti-Iran policy and were important for the success of any southern pipeline from Central Asia that would avoid Iran."<sup>162</sup> It was only in the late 1990s when Taliban's atrocities worsened that the U.S. government openly condemned them. Meanwhile, Taliban sympathizers in the Pakistani government kept the relationship between the two strong, even though the former was clearly going on its own path, separate from Pakistan's dictates.

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<sup>161</sup> Ibid., 23.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid., 46.



Two decades of war and cross-border movements created economic and political ties between Afghan Taliban and Pakistan's Pashtun groups. Many Taliban leaders had extensive networks in Pakistan but the Pakistan government paid little or no attention to these ties. Most of the focus during the 1980s and 1990s was on defeating the Soviets and installing a friendly regime that then General and President Zia ul Haq assumed would make at least Pakistan's western border safe so the government could fully concentrate on securing its eastern border with India.<sup>163</sup> "The Taliban fostered Pashtun nationalism, albeit of an Islamic character and it began to affect Pakistani Pashtuns... On both sides, Pashtun tribes are slipping towards fundamentalism and becoming increasingly implicated in drug trafficking."<sup>164</sup> Today, the Taliban have infiltrated the Pashtun community in such a way that it is difficult to distinguish them from the crowd. Afghanistan's Taliban movement and its exiled fighters have inspired new militants from Pashtun groups to wage *jihad* in Pakistan against the government and its western allies, and to instill a more rigid interpretation of the Islamic *shariah* law.

The Taliban's rule was characterized by brutal violence both toward the locals and international organizations, a strict interpretation of the Islamic *shariah* law and suppression of women. Following the events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. and its ally, the non-Pashtun Northern Alliance, attacked Taliban-controlled Afghanistan when they refused to hand over bin Laden. Many Taliban soldiers, which included not just Afghans, but also Chechens, Uzbeks, Chinese and other central Asians, found

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<sup>163</sup> Ibid., 185.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid., 187.

safe haven in Pakistan's tribal areas, where the elders harbored them under the *Pukhtunwali* code of *melmastia* (hospitality). The Taliban also shared the same Pashtun heritage as the tribes on Pakistan's side of the border. There was also widespread sympathy for these "holy warriors," which were seen as fighting for Islam and deep resentment against the "infidel" Western forces, with U.S. as the chief aggressor. Pakistan not only served as the center of refuge for the exiled Taliban, but it became the breeding group for militant activities, which continue to rage on today.

Ahmed Rashid had rightly predicted that Pakistan's foreign policy toward Afghanistan would one day impact its own national security, domestic politics and create an Islamic fundamentalist backlash.<sup>165</sup> Pakistan, what Ahmed dubs as "an already fragile state beset by an identity crisis," has been hit by a wave of sectarian violence and suicide bombings.<sup>166</sup>

As early as the late 1990s, Pashtun areas like Waziristan were experiencing harsh *shariah* laws, a stricter dress code for women and an even more repressive way of life. Even the then U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott predicted in 1999: "With the emergence of the Taliban there is growing reason to fear that militant extremism, obscurantism and sectarianism will infect surrounding countries. None of these countries has more to lose than Pakistan if 'Talibanization' was to spread further."<sup>167</sup>

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<sup>165</sup> Ibid., xvi.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid., 93.

<sup>167</sup> Strobe Talbott, "Dialogue, Democracy and Nuclear Weapons in South Asia," (lecture: Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, January 16, 1999).

For many in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the U.S.' abandonment of Afghanistan following Soviet withdrawal was seen as a sign of desertion. Many in the region asserted that the U.S. only cared about its own strategic interest and left when it ended, furthering the legacy of the "Kalashnikov culture" and drugs. Thus far, neither the U.S. nor Pakistan has had much luck in curbing the currents of violence in the tribal areas, and many academics predict this is only the start of bigger problems. Akbar Ahmed predicted, "If the Americans crossed into Waziristan and occupied it, what was happening in Iraq after the fall of Baghdad in 2003 would seem like a picnic."<sup>168</sup>

The Pakistani government has denied direct involvement of U.S. forces in Waziristan but recent news reports by the Pakistani media, the BBC and *The New York Times* say that the U.S. Air Force has been carrying out air strikes in the northwest frontier region of Pakistan. News reports have cited sources stating that these strikes are believed to have been conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) using Predator drones.<sup>169</sup> Officials speaking on the basis of anonymity have told *The New York Times* that strikes have been launched from Afghanistan. In June 2008, American air strikes killed 11 Pakistani paramilitary soldiers; U.S. defense officials said they were trying to retaliate against Taliban fighters who crossed into

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<sup>168</sup> Ahmed, *Resistance and Control in Pakistan*, Preface to the revised edition.

<sup>169</sup> The Associated Press, "9 Suspected Insurgents Killed in Missile Strikes, Pakistanis Say," *The New York Times*, August 13, 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/14/world/asia/14pstan.html?ref=asia>.

Afghanistan from Pakistan to attack U.S. troops, but incorrect grid coordinates led them to hit Pakistani forces instead.<sup>170</sup>

#### IV. The Refugee Problem

Pakistan currently hosts more than 2 million refugees and asylum-seekers, the largest number in the world; most of these refugees are Afghans.<sup>171</sup> Years of constant war, famine, drought and lack of employment opportunities drove throngs of Afghans to Pakistan, which was preferred over Iran because of its Sunni majority. Afghanistan ranked as the world's worst humanitarian disaster zone in 2001 and Afghans make up the largest number of illegal migrant workers in Europe.<sup>172</sup> Even though some Afghans have returned to their country, there is still a large refugee population, specifically in Pakistan's northwest Pashtun areas.

There were three major periods of Afghan exodus: during the 1979-1989 Soviet-Afghan war, during the Najibullah and Taliban governments in the 1990s, and from 2000-2001, when the country was hit by severe droughts and later attacked by the U.S.<sup>173</sup> By the time the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, there were an estimated 3.3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan and 2.2 million in Iran, becoming the single largest concentration of refugees in the world.<sup>174</sup> Many of the refugee camps in which

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<sup>170</sup> Eric Schmitt, "Pakistan Post was not in U.S. Records," *The New York Times*, July 16, 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/16/world/asia/16inquiry.html?ref=world>.

<sup>171</sup> UNHCR, "2007 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons," June 2008, <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/4852366f2.pdf>, 8.

<sup>172</sup> Rashid, *Taliban*, xii, xiii.

<sup>173</sup> George Groenewold, *Millenium Development Indicators of Education, Employment and Gender Inequality of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Country Report*, (The Hague, Netherlands: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2006), 11.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid.

the Afghans stayed, especially in the NWFP, have now become their permanent dwelling.

In 2007, Afghanistan had the largest number of repatriates, with 374,000 people returning to their country, but it also continued to be the leading country of origin for refugees.<sup>175</sup> As of the end of 2007, there were almost 3.1 million Afghan refugees or people in a refugee-like situation, comprising 27 percent of the global refugee population. About 96 percent of them were located in Iran and Pakistan. There were 2.033 million refugees and in refugee-like situations in Pakistan at the end of 2007, 886,700 of whom were assisted by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).<sup>176</sup> However, that number could possibly be underestimated, given that many Afghans – specifically those part of the Taliban regime – who crossed the border into Pashtun areas and settled with tribes in FATA were most likely not included. There were also many unregistered camps during the refugee exodus that are not manned by the Government of Pakistan or UNHCR. Many of these camps were in areas where government had little or no authority, such as Waziristan.

The pace of repatriation for Afghan refugees accelerated between 2002 and 2004, after the Taliban were replaced by the government of President Hamid Karzai. But the speed of repatriation has slowed down since then because of security concerns specifically in the southern and eastern part of the country; additionally, many Afghans have been living outside their country for more than 20 years and

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<sup>175</sup> UNHCR, “2007 Global Trends,” 9.

<sup>176</sup> Ibid.

more than 50 percent were born overseas, making it difficult for them to return to a country they do not know, according to the UNHCR.<sup>177</sup>

As of 2006, of the refugees in Pakistani camps, two out of three were below age 25; in non-urban areas, 54 percent of refugees were men.<sup>178</sup> There was one camp in North Waziristan agency; the number of camps in South Waziristan was unknown. Akbar Ahmed estimated that during his term as Political Agent of the South Waziristan Agency in 1980, there was a refugee to local ratio of 1:6 there, and of 1:2 in the North Waziristan Agency.<sup>179</sup> Many of these Afghans living in “refugee-like situations” were not provided support by the UNHCR.

Many in the government claimed that dealing with such a large influx of refugees and playing the part of the host country was not an easy task for the Pakistani government. While some international agencies have criticized the government for not doing enough to take care of the refugees, Pakistani officials refuted the criticism, stating that the administration had treated them generously and paid through its own coffers despite aid money.<sup>180</sup> The importance of refugees is important to understand because one, it shows what a deep impact a conflict in one country (Afghanistan) can have on its neighbors (chiefly Pakistan). Secondly, the consistent flow of refugees for nearly 30 years has weakened the pace of economic

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<sup>177</sup> UNHCR, “Afghanistan, Still Major Challenges Ahead,” October 2007, <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/afghan?page=intro>.

<sup>178</sup> Groenewold, *Millenium Development Indicators*, 18.

<sup>179</sup> Akbar S. Ahmed, “How to Aid Afghan Refugees,” *Rain*, no. 39 (August 1980): 7.

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

growth in the Frontier and burdened an already staggering regional economy.<sup>181</sup>

Thirdly, many Taliban fighters slipped into Pakistan after the U.S. invaded Afghanistan in late 2001. Most likely, these Taliban fighters were not counted in the UNHCR surveys. It was a natural sanctuary; the Taliban were mostly Pashtun, an ethnic group straddling the border, and included many Pakistanis, mostly from the tribal areas, and of these especially Wazirs, the chief tribe of Waziristan.<sup>182</sup> Fourthly, and most importantly, given the demographics of the refugees and lack of resources and livelihoods, many children and youth from these camps were swept up by the currents of militancy.

The core of the Taliban grew from the Pashtun refugee camps, mostly in Pakistan, where a modified and selectively interpreted version of Wahhabist Islam influenced some madrassa students (*talib*) to adopt an ultraconservative approach to social issues and politics. Theological students fighting for professed rights and freedoms are not a new phenomenon in the region, and these talibs, now formally calling themselves the Taliban, presented themselves as righteous religious students on the march for peace.<sup>183</sup>

One Pakistani author wrote: “Jihad was the only skill taught to the refugee children. Very often, it was the best, if not the only, employment available to young Afghans. The jihad industry benefited Pakistan’s establishment, Afghan warlords and a section of the Pakhtoon elite, including drug barons, smugglers and Maulanas<sup>184</sup> ... War is indeed a heroic thing when it is fought in someone else’s territory.”<sup>185</sup>

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<sup>181</sup> There is no data available to quantify the impact of refugees in FATA on the regional economy. Academics concur that limited resources in the region have been depleted even further due to the surge in population.

<sup>182</sup> *The Economist*, “Asia, Taliban All Over: Pakistan’s Militant Drift,” April 14, 2007, 61.

<sup>183</sup> Afsar, Samples and Wood, “The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis,” 60.

<sup>184</sup> A synonym for *mullah*.

<sup>185</sup> Zaigham Khan, “Lingering in Jalozai Camp,” *The News*, April 24, 2008, [http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily\\_detail.asp?id=108541](http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=108541).

V. New Wine in Old Bottles:<sup>186</sup> Pakistan's Conflict

Since 1947, the tribes, for the most part, maintained neutral relations with the Government of Pakistan. Many Pashtuns, including those from Waziristan, left their homes to fight in what they considered was the Kashmir “*jihad*” against Indians. Nevertheless, calls for an independent Pashtunistan, were never fully muted. With some support from Afghanistan, pro-Pashtunistan *maliks* organized small tribal invasions of Pakistani territory, but these were trivial and died down without much fervor. The Pashtun population grew rapidly; while the Pakistani government built more schools and migration of Pashtun labors and businessmen to metropolitan cities increased, poverty also grew. Chapter Three will analyze the economic data in this region in more detail. Some tribes opted out of what they believed were “modernizing” influences, such as schools or roads.<sup>187</sup>

The army was largely absent in the Frontier, which was entrusted to the Frontier Corps, a federal paramilitary force assembled from local tribesmen and designed to help local law enforcement.<sup>188</sup> With the exception of small-scale operations in the tribal areas, the Pakistani government stayed out of Waziristan and the army never entered the area. That changed in 2002, when then Commander-in-Chief and President, Pervez Musharraf chose to side with the U.S. in its “war on terror” despite opposition by many Pakistanis who believed the war in the tribal areas was not theirs to fight. Pressured by Washington, Musharraf deployed the Pakistani

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<sup>186</sup> This is what Caroe referred to as the repetition of the same cycle and the continuation of The Great Game.

<sup>187</sup> Beattie, *Imperial Frontier*, 214.

<sup>188</sup> Hassan Abbas, “Transforming Pakistan’s Frontier Force,” *Terrorism Monitor*, The Jamestown Foundation 5, no. 6 (March 29, 2007): 5.



military to FATA to fight an alliance between foreign and local militants from the Wazir and Mahsud tribes. For the U.S., wrapped up in a war in Afghanistan that had spilled into Pakistan, it was imperative to curb Al-Qaeda's activities and find Osama bin Laden, who was heard to be taking refuge in the mountainous regions of Pakistan's tribal areas. "The Pakistani army, in an explicit show of support from American troops across the border in Afghanistan, was now at the international border in the Agency for the first time in history, but attempted to keep a low profile... American troops had found themselves having to take a crash course in the Great Game."<sup>189</sup>

By that time, by bribing local elders and finding refuge under the *Pukhtunwali* code of hospitality, foreign militants were able to fight the government and gain support from many tribes. However, these new militants infringed upon the tribal system by establishing their own governance structures and even beheading tribal elders who did not support them. This led many tribal elders, who initially supported the Taliban, to turn against them and flee to safer areas.

In the spring of 2004, American troops launched "Operation Mountain Storm" along the Afghan frontier after a "high value target" was spotted in the South Waziristan Agency. However, the Pakistani army, which was aiding U.S. troops, retreated when more than 100 Pakistani personnel were killed or kidnapped and the fighting spread to the North Waziristan Agency.<sup>190</sup> Seeing that the military buildup only fuelled resentment, the government reached accords with the tribes in April 2004

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<sup>189</sup> Ahmed, *Resistance and Control in Pakistan*, Preface to the revised edition.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid.

in South Waziristan and on 5 September 2006 in North Waziristan.<sup>191</sup> But the peace agreement did not last long. The Government of Pakistan tried to give incentives to tribes to combat foreign militants, but that strategy did not yield any results either; in fact, tribesmen who were not part of the militant groups were afraid of siding with the government in fear of a militant backlash. The government described the conflict as local tribes recoiling against Al-Qaeda-type militants.<sup>192</sup>

The government of Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani, which came into office in March 2008 as a coalition between led by the Pakistan's People's Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N), promised to initiate talks with the militants and a brief ceasefire was accorded by the Tehrik-i-Taliban in April 2008. But their leader, Baitullah Mehsud, soon suspended talks with authorities, resuming attacks against the government.<sup>193</sup> To appease the militants, the Pakistani army swapped prisoners with the pro-Taliban groups in South Waziristan in exchange for security personnel who had been kidnapped. Furthermore, it cut back the number of troops in the tribal areas, a move criticized by NATO and the U.S.<sup>194</sup>

The Government of Pakistan's military involvement in North and South Waziristan Agencies continues to change, but as of this writing, no peace accord had been reached and the Government of Pakistan had not declared a clear victory in the war against Taliban groups. U.S. lawmakers have publicly complained that the

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<sup>191</sup> The Crisis Group, *Pakistan's Tribal Areas*, 23.

<sup>192</sup> *Economist*, "Asia: Taliban All Over," 61.

<sup>193</sup> *BBC News*, "Attacks Test Pakistan Ceasefire," May 6, 2008, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/7384895.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7384895.stm).

<sup>194</sup> *BBC News*, "Pakistan in Taleban Prisoner Swap," May 14, 2008, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/7401291.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7401291.stm).

Pakistani government is not doing enough to combat the militants and stop cross-border raids into Afghanistan.<sup>195</sup> As the next chapter will discuss, U.S. aid to Pakistan has increased considerably after the start of the “war on terror” in 2001. Most of that aid has been directed toward the Pakistani army, but the U.S. government has also pledged to help develop more economic and educational reforms.

U.S. involvement has not been favorably looked upon in the tribal areas. As the historical analysis has shown, not only are the tribes staunchly mindful of their independence, they have been hesitant to accept authority of any central government, even that of Pakistan. For many young militants, the U.S. is not only encroaching on tribal sovereignty but also trying to conquer and subdue the Islamic world. This thinking is not new, as the analysis of the British colonial era has showed. As in the past, many militants, whatever their real grievances and motives may be, have portrayed the conflict in terms of Islam versus the infidels. According to the International Crisis Group, “The problem for Pakistan was that Washington had demonized Bin Laden to such an extent that he had become a hero for many Muslims, particularly in Pakistan.”<sup>196</sup> The government is facing a monumental challenge in curbing the spread of Taliban ideologies in the country, which has spread beyond the FATA to NWFP. As a local journalist said, “Talibanization is seeping out of the tribal areas and spreading like a jungle fire.”<sup>197</sup>

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<sup>195</sup> Jane Perlez and Pir Zubair Shah, “13 Killed in Attack on a Bus in Pakistan,” *New York Times*, August 13, 2008. <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/world/asia/13pstan.html?ref=world>.

<sup>196</sup> Rashid, *Taliban*, 182.

<sup>197</sup> The Crisis Group, *Pakistan’s Tribal Areas*, 24.

## VI. Role of Religious Leaders

In a decentralized, unrestricted system like the Pashtun tribal structure, it is difficult for any one person to emerge as the sole leader. In addition, Islam does not have any formal priesthood, which often makes religious leadership questionable. The *mullahs* in the tribal areas are mainly responsible for giving children religious education, leading the prayers in the mosque and acting as a spiritual guide. Nevertheless, religious leaders, or *mullahs*, often hold influence and have been known to rile the tribes against “infidels.” “Leaders have always tended to be holy men, appealing to their tribesmen to fight for Islam... Even where conflict has been politically inspired, religion has never been far behind as a force for justification and sanction.”<sup>198</sup> In turn, claiming religious authority made one a political leader automatically.<sup>199</sup> For the strict Sunni Pashtun, an attack on Islam is an attack on *Pukhtunwali* that can only be revenged by killing the perpetrator.<sup>200</sup>

The *mullah's* power was well explained by Theodore Pennell, a Christian missionary and doctor who lived among the Afghan tribes in the early twentieth century:

For one thing, knowledge has been almost limited to the priestly class, and in a village where the *mullahs* are almost the only men who can lay claim to anything more than the most rudimentary learning it is only natural that they should have the people of the village entirely in their control. Then, the Afghan is a Mohamedan to the backbone, and prides himself on his religious zeal, so that the *mullah* becomes to him the embodiment of what is most national and sacred.<sup>201</sup>

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<sup>198</sup> Stinger, *Lords of The Khyber*, 24, 158.

<sup>199</sup> Beattie, *Imperial Frontier*, 156.

<sup>200</sup> Stinger, *Lords of The Khyber*, 158.

<sup>201</sup> Ibid., 159.

Waziristan was the site of many religious upheavals, both against the British and later, the Government of Pakistan.

As British penetration of tribal territory increased, it is worth drawing attention to the fact that its defence tended to be increasingly expressed in Islamic terms, seen as jihad and led by religious rather than secular leaders. A similar process is observable in many other parts of the Islamic world which came under European pressure at this time, for example, in the Caucasus, Kurdistan and Somalia.<sup>202</sup>

Many of these religious leaders, like the Faqir of Ipi, or Mullah Powindah, gained political influence and commanded a large following amid the orthodox tribes.<sup>203</sup> As has been the case historically, the tribes are often easily riled by religious rhetoric, which is ingrained in the tenets of *Pukhtunwali*.

“The Pathan is susceptible to Islamic symbols such as ‘jihad’, religious wars, and quick to respond to them...”<sup>204</sup> However, scholars disagree on the extent of the *mullahs* power of persuasion. Akbar Ahmed argues that *mullahs* only emerge as leaders in time of great crisis, and usually against non-Muslim. Otherwise, his role is “humdrum.”<sup>205</sup> Nevertheless, history shows there is a trend of religious uprisings, with *mullahs* playing a dominant role, when a foreign power encroaches in tribal territory. “The pervasiveness of Islamic belief and the hatred of non-believers make intrusion by outsiders into Pushtun territory a dangerous undertaking.”<sup>206</sup> The conflict today has often been expressed in religious terms. Violence entrepreneurs claim that

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<sup>202</sup> Beattie, *Imperial Frontier*, 197.

<sup>203</sup> For a detailed account of his religious uprisings, see Warren, *Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi, and the Indian Army* and Theodore L. Pennell, *Among the Wild Tribes of the Afghan Frontier*, (London: Seeley, 1909).

<sup>204</sup> Ahmed, *Millenium and Charisma Among Pathans*, 52.

<sup>205</sup> Ibid., 53.

<sup>206</sup> Stinger, *Lords of the Khyber*, 160.

the Pakistani government, and specifically Musharraf, has wrongly aligned the country with Western powers that are allegedly on a mission to destabilize Islam.

The Afghan *jihad* against the Soviet Union started as a tribal uprising led by clan chiefs and *ulema*, senior religious scholars.<sup>207</sup> But even the role of religious leaders has changed. The *ulema*, according to Ahmed Rashid, rarely challenged traditional Afghan structure like the *jirga* but new Islamicists like the Taliban denigrated the centuries-old tribal arrangement and instead pursued a more radical political ideology.<sup>208</sup> The same game is playing out in Pakistan's tribal areas, where young militants, egged on by the motivation for *jihad*, are diminishing the importance of tribal elders and trying to diminish the tribal values and structure that have coexisted with orthodox Islam for centuries. Religion has often been used as a tool to give identity to a cause and unite the warring tribes. "The historical idiomatic response through which Islamic sentiment expresses itself in times of extreme crisis is 'jihad'. The major stimulation is religion."<sup>209</sup> This trend has not changed. When the Taliban took over, it was not Pashtun nationalism that necessarily increased sympathy toward them, but the idea that they were fighting for Islam against foreign "infidels." In today's conflict, the same rule applies. Militants have been waving the banner of Islam to stir soldiers into what they conceive is foreign domination imposed by Pakistan, an Islamic state turned on the wrong path. As Ahmed stated, "The emergence of mullahs, pirs and fakirs<sup>210</sup> dabbling in politics is a constant

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<sup>207</sup> Rashid, *Taliban*, 19.

<sup>208</sup> Ibid.

<sup>209</sup> Ahmed, *Millenium and Charisma Among Pathans*, 106.

<sup>210</sup> Also religious figures.

phenomenon in the tribal areas. Unchecked, such men may create considerable problems for the administration, especially in times of general regional tension.”<sup>211</sup>

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<sup>211</sup> Ahmed, *Resistance and Control in Pakistan*, 94.

## **Chapter Three**

### **The Political Economy of Conflict**

*“When citizens are denied their basic  
human rights, they become radicalized.  
When people are powerless,  
they are easily manipulated.  
This is what worries me the most.”*

Rashid Rehman, Pakistani Human Rights Lawyer<sup>212</sup>

The conflict in Waziristan is a combination of many factors – grievances against the government, absence of strong regional institutions, rising drug and arms trade and a weak security structure in FATA. But one of the key factors, as Caroe argued about past conflicts, and that this thesis will show, is lack of economic development in Waziristan and the greater FATA. This chapter will explore the economic situation in the region in light of Caroe’s assessments and the impact and effectiveness of aid.

#### **I. Neglected Pakistanis**

The rapid growth in Pakistan’s economy in the early twenty-first century was mainly concentrated in urban centers like Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad and has not filtered down to the barren lands of FATA, which remains one of Pakistan’s poorest regions, with high poverty and unemployment and underdeveloped infrastructure. As an article in *The Economist* stated, “They (the people of Waziristan) are probably the most neglected Pakistanis.”<sup>213</sup> While the tribes have rejected what they consider

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<sup>212</sup> Quoted in article by Don Belt, “Struggle for the Soul of Pakistan,” *National Geographic*, September 2007, 32-59.

<sup>213</sup> *Economist*, “Asia: Taliban All Over,” 61.



modernizing and Western influences, there is a strong demand for boys' schools and hospitals, one which the Government of Pakistan has overlooked.

The latest economic data on FATA was compiled by the Government of Pakistan in 2000, and there is no reliable current data.<sup>214</sup> According to The Crisis Group's estimates, per capita income in FATA was less than half that of the national per capita income of \$800 in 2006. Sixty percent of people lived below the national poverty line and per capita development expenditure was one-third of the national average.<sup>215</sup> The overall literacy rate was 17.42 percent; the male average was 29.51 percent and females a mere 3 percent.<sup>216</sup> Waziristan had one hospital bed per 6,000 inhabitants.<sup>217</sup>

Table 3– FATA Educational Statistics, 1999-2000

<b>Educational Institutions</b>	<b>Pakistan</b>	<b>FATA</b>	<b>FATA as percentage share of Pakistan</b>
Primary Schools, total	162,500	3,276	2.02
Male	104,900	2,120	2.02
Female	57,600	1,156	2.01
Middle Schools, total	18,400	347	1.88
Male	10,300	259	2.51
Female	8,100	88	1.08
High Schools, total	12,600	201	1.60
Male	8,000	183	2.28
Female	4,600	18	0.39

<sup>214</sup> The informal economy, which includes trade of smuggled goods, drugs and arms, is not included in the government's statistics. Hence, it is possible that the GDP is higher than what is reported. However, the income disparity between the various groups in FATA is also wide. Prior to the conflict, the *maliks* were the richest class in the tribal society. Many elders also received allowances from the government. In the current conflict, the violence entrepreneurs control arms and drug trade and use revenues from it to support their rebellion.

<sup>215</sup> The Crisis Group, *Pakistan's Tribal Areas*, 9.

<sup>216</sup> The statistics are from the 1998 Government Census Report. See Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, "Statistical Abstract of F.A.T.A.," Planning and Development Department Government of NWFP, <http://www.nwfpbos.sdnpc.org/fds/education.htm>.

<sup>217</sup> "Asia: Taliban All Over," *Economist*, 61.

Inter & Degree Colleges, total	853	9	1.06
Male	509	9	1.76
Female	344	0	0
<b>Enrollment (by level)</b>			
Primary School, total	20,399,000	266,713	1.30
Male	11,720,000	205,749	1.76
Female	8,679,000	60,964	0.70
Middle School, total	4,338,000	40,949	0.94
Male	2,631,000	37,158	1.41
Female	1,707,000	3,791	0.22
High School, total	1,795,000	15,166	0.84
Male	1,105,000	13,985	1.26
Female	690,000	1,181	0.17
Inter & Degree Colleges, total	791,000	3,007	0.38
Male	435,000	3,007	0.69
Female	356,000	0	0
<b>Literacy Ratio (percentage) – 1998 Census</b>			
Total	45.00	17.42	
Male	56.50	29.51	
Female	32.60	3.00	

Table 4– FATA Health Statistics, 1999-2000

	Pakistan	FATA	FATA as percentage share of Pakistan
<b>Institutions</b>			
Hospitals	876	42	4.8
Dispensaries	4,635	170	3.7
Maternity and Child Health Center	856	17	2.0
<b>Medical Personnel</b>			
Doctors	91,823	408	0.4
Nurses	37,623	69	0.2
Lady Health Visitors	5,619	132	2.3
<b>Beds Strengths</b>			
Total Beds	93,907	1,263	1.3
<b>Selected Ratios</b>			
Population per Bed	1,495	2,645	
Population per Doctor	1,529	8,819	

Source: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, “Statistical Abstract of F.A.T.A.,” 1999-2000.

The main source of income is pastoralism, agriculture and drug trade, the activities of which are concentrated in few hands; there is little industrial

development, other than an arms factory, but there are few jobs relative to the population.<sup>218</sup> Major crops grown in FATA are wheat, rice, maize and barley. South Waziristan was popular for its dry fruits, which were exported to China, India, Afghanistan and markets in the rest of Pakistan, but export activity has stopped because of the conflict.<sup>219</sup> Cultivable land has become relatively scarce; only seven percent of FATA is estimated to be arable. There are natural resources such as minerals and coal but they are underexploited.<sup>220</sup> Transport and communications infrastructure, including roads, is in dismal shape, and, in many areas, predate the 1947 partition. Many villages do not even have electricity. As BBC News journalist Aamer Ahmed Khan stated, “Entering Waziristan feels like travelling back in time. The sparsely populated and dramatic barren hills show few signs of having encountered modern times. The fortress-like houses that occasionally dot the landscape add to that image.”<sup>221</sup>

Rent-seeking activities have concentrated power and income into the hands of the few at the expense of the rest of the population in FATA. Rent-seeking, which is defined as the effort to acquire access to or control over opportunities for earning rents, or monopoly profits,<sup>222</sup> diverts efforts from improving overall economic activity and welfare to inefficient activities, such as lobbying and outright bribery to

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<sup>218</sup> The Crisis Group, *Pakistan's Tribal Areas*, 9.

<sup>219</sup> *Pakistan Press International Information Services*, “Military Operation Affecting South Waziristan Economy,” June 23, 2004.

<sup>220</sup> The Crisis Group, *Pakistan's Tribal Areas*, 9.

<sup>221</sup> Aamer Ahmed Khan, “The Taleban Stronghold of Waziristan,” BBC News, April 24, 2006, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/4939688.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4939688.stm).

<sup>222</sup> Jacqueline Coolidge and Susan Rose-Ackerman, “High-Level Rent Seeking and Corruption in African Regimes: Theory and Cases,” Working Papers and Articles (WPS 1780), The World Bank, 1997, 3.

obtain preferential access to rents or to create rents through policies. It has virtually no benefits for the economy or people in general, and only fattens the pocketbooks of a few at the expense of many. Despite little or no government regulations in the FATA, the barriers to entry are high and those who cannot afford to pay rents cannot actively participate in the economy. Protection rackets run by gangs of violence entrepreneurs extort money. Additionally, a monopoly on business trade and economic activities by the Mahsuds has left Wazirs and other tribes out of the scheme. Collier et al. argue that rent-seeking often makes a country more prone to conflict, especially where political and social cleavages are already present. Special privileges granted to one group create resentment, especially in a society which is already economically underdeveloped.

The relationship between the Political Agent and the *maliks* is very much a patron-client one. For example, the Political Agent is in charge of allocating funds and overseeing development projects in FATA. It is a position that presents rent-seeking opportunities such that a *malik* can coerce or bribe the Political Agent to build a specific road or school in his area rather than another where there might be a greater need. Many have criticized the Political Agent for exploiting his position for personal enrichment by selective distribution of patronage to *maliks*, the local elites who serve as representatives of their tribes; there is no input from the local population or even their parliamentary representatives in development projects.<sup>223</sup> The position of Political Agent and the system of *maliks* has come under fire for breeding

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<sup>223</sup> The Crisis Group, *Pakistan's Tribal Areas*, 9.

corruption. It created resentment among tribesmen who were left out of rent-seeking schemes; the rhetoric that government is corrupt has also been employed by violence entrepreneurs.

In addition, there is a complex hierarchical system of government leadership that exists below the Political Agent. And just like the rest of Pakistan, there is a very large government bureaucracy in the NWFP and in the FATA, and there are many rent-seeking opportunities that arise in these positions. Most of the rents are generated from trade activities, given the scarcity of arable land. It is possible that minerals mining and industries also provide opportunities to earn rents but there is little data available to verify that analysis.

Rent-seeking opportunities have also caused income from weapons flow and trade of illegal goods to become concentrated in the hands of a few, and it has done little to improve the political economy of FATA. Drug trade is concentrated mainly in the hands of violence entrepreneurs and drug barons.<sup>224</sup> For example, the Taliban in Afghanistan generated revenues from the narcotics industry of nearly \$8 billion.<sup>225</sup>

According to historian Hugh Beattie, Pakistan's adoption of the "Close Border Policy" when it was created and increasing tribal population has contributed to growing economic inequality and tension between rich and poor.<sup>226</sup> From the 1970s onward, the Government of Pakistan pursued a "cautious forward policy" in the tribal areas, but the influx of Afghan refugees in subsequent years and growth in drug trade

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<sup>224</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>225</sup> Yossef Bodansky, *Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America*, (New York: Random House, 2001), 315.

<sup>226</sup> Beattie, *Imperial Frontier*, 215.

has dented efforts to improve the economy. Families in the tribal areas still live in mud houses that are unable to withstand storms, rain and snow, much less military bombardments.

Figure 5– A Damaged Mud House in North Waziristan



Source: Reuters, 2007.

## II. The Wild West of Free Trade<sup>227</sup>

The British eliminated customs duties on the Frontier to encourage tribes to trade with India. Pakistan continued this policy after its creation, and despite debates on whether to change customs laws, little has been done to regulate trade. The Pakistani government tried to introduce new economic opportunities to integrate the

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<sup>227</sup> Rashid, *Taliban*, 190.

tribes into the rest of the country, but those were only met with mediocre success. It did find some success in establishing more schools, but women's education has considerably lagged behind the rest of the country, partially because of government's lack of awareness-increasing activities and partially because of tribes' resistance.

A private industrial sector is virtually non-existent. Up until a few years ago, there was little impetus to improve the industrial sector, both from the Government of Pakistan as well as the tribes. In Waziristan, a silk and synthetic weaving industry developed but it is unknown how many people participate in it. Some Pashtuns, especially from the Mahsud tribe, have migrated to the Middle East or other Pakistani cities for work or established trade in the southern port city of Karachi and send remittances to their families. There are no surveys about how much that contributes to the regional economy. Trade in the FATA Agencies revolves mainly around the informal market in the form of trading and selling of luxury goods and arms.

While critics have placed the bulk of the blame for lack of development schemes on the Government of Pakistan, it is important to acknowledge that implementing economic schemes in the tribal areas is not easy.<sup>228</sup> Although each tribe differs from the other, some have not welcomed improvement plans, especially when it comes to women's education and have been hesitant to "modernize." Scholar and former Political Agent Akbar Ahmed wrote, "Indifference, even ill-concealed contempt, greets book learning as a deviation from the Waziristan model of behavior.

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<sup>228</sup> As British officer G.C.S. Curtis said, "Economic development projects like land improvement schemes were difficult to implement because officers needed tribal protection to visit sites." See Gerald Colville Seymore Curtis, "Notes on Service in India 1939-47," memoir.

The tribesman's question about the schoolteacher, 'What worlds has he conquered?', is a general indictment of education."<sup>229</sup>

Nevertheless, the Government of Pakistan was presented with numerous opportunities to make headway into the tribal agencies. While it did build more schools, it put little effort in FATA compared to the rest of the country. Even a government document acknowledges this neglect: "Since the independence of Pakistan, FATA has not been accorded the same priority in terms of the development process being undertaken in other parts of the country. Consequently quality of life in FATA is far behind when compared with the NWFP or the national figures."<sup>230</sup> The only time that the government took serious interest in this region was during the Soviet-Afghan war when the military regime of Zia ul Haq let arms and drug trade flourish. In the 1990s, Benazir Bhutto's government tried to improve roads, but mainly to win political favor. Following the spotlight that was once again fixed on the region following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the Pakistani government promised more resources for building schools, universities, infrastructure and industry.

To meet Millennium Development Goals, the Pakistan Ministry of Commerce estimates that it needs to create at least 100,000 jobs in FATA. The military has announced development projects worth millions of dollars for building roads, schools, and hospitals. Musharraf had said the government will spend \$16.5 million on

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<sup>229</sup> Ahmed, *Resistance and Control in Pakistan*, 27.

<sup>230</sup> FATA Development Authority, *Mohmand Marble City: A Joint Venture of FATA DA and PASDEC*, Brochure (Peshawar, Pakistan: undated), <http://www.fatada.gov.pk/FDAMarbleCityBrochure.pdf>.



development as well as \$150 million in a five-year economic initiative to integrate FATA into the national economy. The government has pledged a \$2 billion, nine-year sustainable development plan.<sup>231</sup> To encourage industry, the government identified potential for exporting sporting and hunting arms manufactured in FATA, stating that the demand stands at 600,000 arms annually and could potentially generate revenues of \$100 million per year.<sup>232</sup> It also plans to exploit and develop the marble industry in Mohmand, Khyber, Bajaur and Kurram agencies, but has not specified whether these will be public or private-sector initiatives. The Government of Pakistan has said that 7,000 million tons of good quality marble is found in FATA; currently, only 1 million tons per year is excavated, hence there is potential for more mining activities. New factories are also planned to block, cut and refine the marble.<sup>233</sup>

The FATA Development Authority (FDA) was established as a semi-autonomous organization in September 2006 “to plan and execute sustainable development projects.”<sup>234</sup> By the middle of 2008, the Government of Pakistan had reportedly pledged \$1 billion for the program, with an additional \$750 million contribution by the U.S.<sup>235</sup> The organization has been mandated to develop “Reconstruction Opportunity Zones” with modern infrastructure and facilities by

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<sup>231</sup> The Crisis Group, *Pakistan's Tribal Areas*, 10.

<sup>232</sup> The status of the project called the “Pakistan Hunting & Sporting Arms Development Company (PHSADC) is ongoing. The company wants to develop the industry specifically in Darra Adam Khel in Orakzai Agency where tribesmen are already involved in manufacturing sports weapons and accessories.

<sup>233</sup> FATA Development Authority, *Mohmand Marble City*, 5-7.

<sup>234</sup> FATA Development Authority, <http://fatada.gov.pk/>.

<sup>235</sup> Iqbal Khattak, “US wooing FATA Residents to Back War on Terror,” *The Daily News*, April 29, 2008. [http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C04%5C29%5Cstory\\_29-4-2008\\_pg7\\_13](http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C04%5C29%5Cstory_29-4-2008_pg7_13).

December 2008 for an estimated cost of \$14.4 million (roughly Rs. 1 billion).<sup>236</sup> The government also plans to spend \$86,450 (Rs. 6 million) to study township development in various agencies, and \$29,000 (Rs. 2 million) to study potential tourism opportunities. In early 2008, the Government of Pakistan also commissioned FDA to develop a dam in the North Waziristan Agency. The Dande Dam is expected to cost \$6.4 million (Rs. 442,664 million). FDA is receiving support from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), as will be discussed in more detail later on in this chapter. The projects for FATA sound promising, but it remains to be seen how viable and successful they will be.

In the meantime, the conflict brewing in the region has destabilized an already-unstable economy. Traders in South Waziristan reported that dry fruit trade virtually collapsed in 2004 because of Pakistani military incursions. This resulted in Chinese buyers staying out of the region because of security.<sup>237</sup> Trade of fresh fruits from Wana, capital of South Waziristan Agency, dried up when the conflict began and has not resumed.

### III. Political Economy and Conflict

Caroe strongly believed that development measures would keep the tribes economically and socially occupied, and eventually, would help them integrate into the rest of the country. He felt that the Sandeman system<sup>238</sup> implemented in Baluchistan was met with success, but the British failed in increasing education and

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<sup>236</sup> 1 United States Dollar = 69.4 Pakistan Rupees.

<sup>237</sup> *Pakistan Press*, "Military Operation Affecting South Waziristan Economy."

<sup>238</sup> Sir Robert Groves Sandeman is credited with effectively ending the British Empires' "Close Border Policy" in Baluchistan, and working to incorporate the area into the rest of the Raj. He helped develop a communications and transportation infrastructure linking various tribes.

in general providing infrastructure such as roads, forts and cantonments in Waziristan.

Indirect rule does not work in the absence of support, and if necessary protection, which must be afforded to the tribal authority expected to obtain the results desired by the government. The fiat that there should be maliks was not enough. In Baluchistan, the Sandeman system had been accompanied by the construction of cantonments, forts and roads, making force available at tactical points for the support of the tribal authority... But the Government of India, more interested in the immediate aim of frontier demarcation arising out of the Durand Agreement, turned a deaf ear.<sup>239</sup>

Pakistan continued the British policy of non-interference, causing the tribes to remain on the periphery of the rest of Pakistan economically, politically and socially. Given economic underdevelopment, rent-seeking opportunities and the level of corruption, it is no surprise that the tribes, especially the youth, are increasingly being driven into the arms of the militants. Many unemployed young men in the region have especially been prone to recruitment by pro-Taliban groups and have joined militant groups as a way of gaining livelihoods or enhancing their social importance and power.

Many journalists, scholars and academics have argued that it is not poverty or joblessness that has driven men to militancy, but rather the idea that they are waging a *jihad* for Islam. While this is certainly a rhetoric that has been repeated proudly by militant leaders, and may certainly be one of the causes, this thesis argues that it is mainly used as a grievance that disguises the bigger agenda of gaining power, money and personal enrichment. Case studies of the Faqir of Ipi and Mullah Powindah have shown that motives go well beyond religious rhetoric. They also hide personal

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<sup>239</sup> Caroe, *The Pathans*, 399.

agendas and quest for individual power in a society that is easily assuaged and manipulated by Islamic rhetoric. It is true that many of the top militant leaders are not products of poverty-stricken families and many have obtained higher education. But for the poor tribesman who does not cultivate poppy fields, does not have any arable land, cannot afford to move to another area of Pakistan to earn a living, or transfer abroad, economic deprivation does play a role in his quest to join the militancy. If pro-Taliban groups offer them incentives, they are easily recruited. “In the tribal areas, where there is no other employment to speak of, the influx of the militants’ money was just one more means by which they gained influence.”<sup>240</sup> In cases where families cannot afford to migrate to other cities, violence entrepreneurs kidnap and coerce young men into joining their rebellion.

Fostering economic development, especially from the bottom up, can help curb conflict. As this thesis has argued, for some poverty-stricken citizens, joining a rebel group ensures they have food, shelter and clothing and a chance for a leadership position, which they probably would not have otherwise. As one tribesman in North Waziristan, Khalid Wazir, said to a journalist, “Development...will undermine the authority of radical Islam by demonstrating to the tribesmen that they needn’t rely blindly on mullahs for their subsistence.”<sup>241</sup>

Where income is low and declining, or unevenly distributed, young people tend to be easily recruited by “entrepreneurs of violence” because their opportunity

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<sup>240</sup> Eliza Griswold, “In the Hiding Zone,” *The New Yorker*, July 26, 2004, [http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/07/26/040726fa\\_fact2?currentPage=1](http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/07/26/040726fa_fact2?currentPage=1).

<sup>241</sup> Ibid.

cost is low, creating hostility and lack of trust toward the government.<sup>242</sup> The opportunity costs for joining a rebellion are low when per capita income is low and there is no prospect for economic growth,<sup>243</sup> as is the case in Waziristan. As Collier has stated, “Low income means poverty, and low growth means hopelessness. Young men, who are the recruits for rebel armies, come pretty cheap in an environment of hopeless poverty. Life itself is cheap, and joining a rebel movement gives these men a small chance of riches.”<sup>244</sup> Taliban fighters reportedly earn as much as \$300, a considerable sum for many jobless tribesmen.<sup>245</sup> “If the reality of daily existence is otherwise awful, the chances of success do not have to be very high to be alluring... The prospect of death is not so much worse than the prospect of life in poverty.”<sup>246</sup>

“In the absence of economic development, neither good political institutions, nor ethnic and religious homogeneity, nor high military spending provide significant defenses against large-scale violence.”<sup>247</sup> The poor economic situation has created grievances among citizens, and rebel leaders seize on the opportunity to exploit these grievances, whether they really care about improving conditions across societies or not.

Many of the Taliban fighters who crossed the border into Waziristan and other agencies initially satisfied the tribes by giving them allowances, separate from the

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<sup>242</sup> Paul Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, 4.

<sup>243</sup> Ibid.

<sup>244</sup> Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can be Done About it*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 20.

<sup>245</sup> Mark Sappenfield, “In Northwestern Pakistan: Where Militants Rule,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, World Section, February 28, 2008, 6.

<sup>246</sup> Collier, *The Bottom Billion*, 29.

<sup>247</sup> Paul Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, 53.

government, and by promising them a better livelihood. In time, they were able to cement their foothold enough to overcome tribal elders. As a *Christian Science Monitor* journalist reported, “Like international analysts, they (the youth of Waziristan) agree on the basics: After the 2001 fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, foreign terrorists came to FATA to exploit its weaknesses. A 17 percent literacy rate, together with a failing agricultural economy, has offered a large pool of disgruntled, uneducated recruits.”<sup>248</sup>

The government of Pakistan’s first tactic was to employ a military strategy, but when that failed, they also tried to influence tribal elders by paying them bounties to turn in pro-Taliban militants. But because of distrust of the government and fear of militant killings, people have little incentive to fight rebel leaders or to provide information to the government against them.

Illiteracy further breeds mistrust and violence. For example, a Pakistani government-sponsored polio vaccination campaign was boycotted in the Bajaur Agency when *mullahs* and militant leaders spread the rumor that the polio campaign was a Western conspiracy heralded by the U.S. to sterilize Muslim children; parents of some 24,000 children refused the polio vaccine.<sup>249</sup>

#### IV. USAID: The “Human Face” of U.S. Foreign Policy<sup>250</sup>

Musharraf’s decision to join the U.S.’ “war on terror” propelled Pakistan to among the top of U.S. aid recipients. Following the events of September 11, 2001, the

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<sup>248</sup> Sappenfield, “In Northwestern Pakistan: Where Militants Rule,” 6.

<sup>249</sup> *Daily Times*, “Health Workers Boycott Polio Vaccination in Bajaur Agency,” February 20, 2007. [http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C02%5C20%5Cstory\\_20-2-2007\\_pg7\\_29](http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C02%5C20%5Cstory_20-2-2007_pg7_29).

<sup>250</sup> A title given to USAID by the US Department of State. See Khattak, “US wooing FATA Residents to Back War on Terror.”

focus of U.S. aid was changed from economic and social development to counterterrorism and “transformational diplomacy,” which placed more emphasis on U.S. security and democracy building as major goals of foreign aid.<sup>251</sup> As a “front line” state in the “war on terror,” Pakistan became a prime beneficiary for the first time since Zia ul Haq’s regime was funded to support the *mujahideen* against the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War. All the economic sanctions that were placed on Pakistan following its nuclear tests and military coup were lifted. In October 2001, President George W. Bush signed an act “exempting Pakistan from coup-related sanctions through FY2002, providing waiver authority on the sanctions through FY2003 and granting an exemption from foreign aid prohibitions related to the country’s loan defaults.”<sup>252</sup> The administration also rescheduled \$379 million of Pakistan’s \$2.7 billion debt to the U.S. so that it could continue receiving aid.<sup>253</sup>

Average annual U.S. aid to Pakistan between 2002 and 2006 was estimated to be \$665 million, up drastically from \$3.4 million between 2000 and 2001.<sup>254</sup> Afghanistan and Pakistan combined receive 84 percent of the aid allocated to Central and South Asia.<sup>255</sup> President Bush has committed to provide at least \$600 million in economic and security assistance to Pakistan through 2009.<sup>256</sup> Most U.S. assistance programs directly or indirectly serve U.S. counterterrorism goals, a report issued for

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<sup>251</sup> Thomas Lum, *CRS Report for Congress, U.S. Foreign Aid to East and South Asia: Selected Recipients*, August 22, 2007, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31362.pdf>, 5.

<sup>252</sup> *Ibid.*, 31.

<sup>253</sup> *Ibid.*, 38.

<sup>254</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>255</sup> Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Request, *Foreign Assistance and USAID Operations*, International Affairs Congressional Budget Justification, [http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2008/fy2008cbj\\_full.pdf](http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2008/fy2008cbj_full.pdf), 8.

<sup>256</sup> *Ibid.*, 576.

the Congress stated. The increase in aid has made the U.S. the largest bilateral aid donor to Pakistan.<sup>257</sup>

Table 5– U.S. Assistance to Pakistan, 2004-2008  
(thousands of dollars)

	FY2004	FY2005	FY2006	FY2007 (estimate)	FY2008 (request)*
Child Survival and Health	25,600	21,00	22,757	22,385	39,800
Development Assistance	49,400	29,000	26,990	95,327	18,000
Economic Support Funds	200,000	297,600	296,595	283,677	382,900
Foreign Military Financing	74,560	298,800	297,000	297,000	300,000
International Military Education and Training	1,384	1,885	2,037	1,992	2,000
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement	31,500	32,150	34,970	24,000	32,000
Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, De-mining and Related Programs	4,930	7,951	8,585	9,997	10,300
<b>Totals</b>	<b>187,374</b>	<b>688,386</b>	<b>688,934</b>	<b>734,358</b>	<b>785,000</b>

*Source:* Congressional Research Service, *U.S. Foreign Aid to East and South Asia: Selected Recipients*, August 22, 2007.

*Primary Sources:* U.S. Department of State, USAID, U.S. Department of Agriculture.

NOTE:

FY2008 figures constitute the amount of aid the administration has requested.

U.S. assistance in FATA has three goals: improve security, stability and economic opportunity.<sup>258</sup> In 2008, about \$90 million in assistance was set aside for this region with the aim of improving education, health facilities, roads and boosting economic growth with the help of local communities. The U.S. has reportedly contributed \$38 million specifically for programs to bring health care and education to tribal areas since 2002.<sup>259</sup>

<sup>257</sup> Lum, *CRS Report for Congress*, 38.

<sup>258</sup> Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Request, *Foreign Assistance and USAID Operations*, 576.

<sup>259</sup> *Economist*, “Asia: Taliban All Over,” 61.



USAID closed its offices in 1995 in Pakistan because of the row over Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons. The mission was restarted by the U.S. government in Islamabad in 2002,<sup>260</sup> and USAID activities in Pakistan have increased considerably since then. USAID also works closely with the Governments of Baluchistan and Sindh provinces to help develop the educational sector. In those areas, it has been met with some success, unlike FATA, where USAID activities have thus far been limited.

Table 6– Breakdown of USAID Funding Since 2002

(millions of dollars)	
<b>Sector</b>	<b>Funding</b>
Emergence Economic Assistance	1,600
Education	256
Health	169
Earthquake and Reconstruction	106
FATA	105
Democracy and Governance	84
Economic Growth	70
Program Support	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,400</b>

*Source:* USAID

In FATA, “USAID’s objectives include enhancing the legitimacy and writ of the Government of Pakistan in FATA; improving economic and social conditions for local communities; and supporting sustainable development.”<sup>261</sup> Between 2002 and 2007, six percent of USAID’s total funds for Pakistan were allocated toward

<sup>260</sup> According to USAID, its operating expenses were \$1.9 million in 2005, \$2.3 million in 2004, \$2.1 million in 2003 and \$760,000 in 2002.

<sup>261</sup> USAID, “USAID FATA Development Program: January-March 2008,” <http://www.usaid.gov/pk/mission/news/fata.htm>.

FATA.<sup>262</sup> From 2002 to 2006, USAID provided \$449 million for education, health, economic growth and good governance. USAID also provided \$67 million in disaster relief following the 2005 earthquakes in Pakistan and has committed \$200 million for long-term care. According to USAID, it is building 130 schools in FATA along with the Government of Japan.<sup>263</sup> Some of USAID's major commitments in FATA include:

- April 2008: A \$90 million project to improve education in Pakistan; including FATA.<sup>264</sup>
- March 2008: As part of the three-year, \$17.9 million "Pakistan Safe Drinking Water and Hygiene Promotion Project," 20 local NGOs received grants to aid in improving water and sanitation in ten districts and two FATA agencies.<sup>265</sup>
- March 2008: A \$20 million project to improve mother and health care, renovate health facilities, train skilled health workers, increase access to clean drinking water and prevent the spread of infectious diseases.<sup>266</sup>
- October 2007: Scholarships to 22 students from FATA were given out as part of USAID-funded Khushhali Bank Scholarship Program.<sup>267</sup>

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<sup>262</sup> USAID, "Testimony of James R. Kunder, Acting Deputy Administrator U.S. Agency for International Development," Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, December 6, 2007, <http://www.usaid.gov/press/speeches/2007/ty071206.html>.

<sup>263</sup> The extent of Japan's involvement is unknown.

<sup>264</sup> USAID, "USAID Launches \$90 Million Project to Improve Education in Pakistan," press release, Islamabad: April 24, 2008.

<sup>265</sup> This includes Bajaur and Kurram Agencies. See USAID, "USAID Supports Access to Clean Drinking Water," press release, Islamabad: March 20, 2008.

<sup>266</sup> USAID, "Ambassador Patterson Reviews \$20m Health Projects with Governor Ghani," press release, Peshawar: March 12, 2008.

<sup>267</sup> USAID, "Khushhali Bank Awards USAID-Funded Scholarships to FATA students," press release, Peshawar: October 29, 2007.

- September 2007: Commitment to provide \$750 million over five years to support FATA development and Pakistan's "Sustainable Development Plan."<sup>268</sup> The U.S. provided \$105 million in 2007 alone for development in the tribal agencies.<sup>269</sup>
- April 2007: First ever "Child Health Day" marked in Khyber Agency as part of the \$11.5-million USAID-funded health program.<sup>270</sup>

Table 7– USAID FATA Development Program

(millions of dollars)		
<b>Project</b>	<b>Goals</b>	<b>Cost</b>
Capacity Building Program	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Strengthen capacity of institutions to plan, implement and monitor programs.</li> <li>· Improve coordination between security and development organizations.</li> <li>· Improve communications.</li> <li>· Increase the ability of civil society to contribute to development.</li> </ul>	43
Capacity Building Support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Build confidence and trust between the Government of Pakistan and tribal communities.</li> <li>· Increase media and communication outreach.</li> </ul>	45
Livelihood	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Generate employment.</li> <li>· Develop skills.</li> <li>· Increase vocational training.</li> <li>· Promote agricultural, livestock and trade-enhancing programs.</li> <li>· Develop infrastructure.</li> <li>· Target group: Between 14 and 30 years of age.</li> </ul>	300
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Improve service delivery for basic education and adult literacy.</li> <li>· Support adult literacy centers.</li> <li>· Create community-level school management committees.</li> <li>· Improve quality and sustainability of teacher education and student performance.</li> </ul>	79.4

<sup>268</sup> This plan is being implemented by FDA.

<sup>269</sup> USAID, "U.S., Pakistan Sign New \$750 million Agreement for FATA Development," press release, Islamabad: September 30, 2007.

<sup>270</sup> US Embassy, Office of Public Affairs, "First 'Child Health Day' Marked in FATA as part of \$11.5m USAID program," press release, Khyber Agency: April 26, 2007.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Rehabilitate schools and construct and furnish new facilities.*</li> <li>· Improve water and environment sanitation in girls' schools.</li> </ul>	
Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Improve service delivery for primary health care.</li> <li>· Extend Pakistan's "Initiative for Mothers and Newborns."</li> <li>· Deliver a package for children under the age of five covering immunization and treatment for respiratory infection, diarrhea, newborn care and nutrition.</li> <li>· Promote Pakistan's "Clean Drinking Water" program.**</li> <li>· Prevent and control infectious diseases.</li> <li>· Promote awareness about HIV and AIDS.</li> </ul>	23.5
Economic Growth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Assist sustainable, long-term economic growth.</li> <li>· Expand micro-credit opportunities.***</li> <li>· Provide support to private sector groups in the marble and granite, gems and jewelry, and furniture sectors to improve production and increase profits.</li> <li>· Build transport infrastructure.</li> </ul>	16

Source: USAID FATA Development Program, January – March 2008.

NOTE:

\*This program is being implemented in five agencies: Bajaur, Kurram, Khyber, Mohmand, Orakzai and three frontier regions: Peshawar, Bannu and Kohat.

\*\*The project is limited to the following six agencies: Bajaur, Mohmand, Orakzai, Khyber, North Waziristan and Kurram, and six frontier regions.

\*\*\*The expansion is focused on five agencies: Khyber, Kurram, Bajaur, Mohmand and Orakzai.

As the data shows, USAID's mission in Pakistan has expanded and is expected to continue growing. The agency has outlined specific goals for development, but the big question is, who are the beneficiaries of this aid and is it working?

### V. Success or Failure?

USAID has outlined significant reforms for FATA such as those discussed above, which have the potential to help catalyze positive change in the dismal

economic situation in FATA, and Waziristan.<sup>271</sup> Sustainable growth and development will also hinge on conducive change from within the tribal areas and the Government of Pakistan, which needs to work to empower its citizens. But firstly, these projects have yet to materialize. Many of the projects are multi-year plans, and thus far, USAID and even Government of Pakistan's aid workers have not been able to penetrate many parts of the tribal areas because of the conflict.

Secondly, these projects have been overshadowed by military operations. Against the backdrop of military incursions, many tribes may be quick to reject development schemes. The Government of Pakistan has little access to these areas, where even the local Frontier Scouts have been attacked by militants. In such a scenario, it is difficult to work with locals and in many cases, the unpredictable security situation just does not make development plans feasible. As Husain Haqqani, Pakistan's current ambassador to the U.S., told a reporter in 2004, "There have been social programs since the nineteen-seventies in the tribal areas... I don't think there are any empirical data to suggest that after your house has been intrusively searched you say, 'Oh, those are the good guys! They put the water fountain in my village.'"<sup>272</sup> Many academics and reporters argue that aid driven by political purposes will not work because trust, a key factor, will be missing, even if its goals are promising. It is

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<sup>271</sup> No information was available on specific projects for Waziristan agencies, except those mentioned. USAID's projects are broad.

<sup>272</sup> Griswold, "In the Hiding Zone," July 26, 2004.

what Pakistani political activist Feroz Ahmed dubbed as “buying political allegiance with hard currency.”<sup>273</sup>

Thirdly, there is little mention as to *how* these projects will be implemented. Getting access to some tribal agencies, like North Waziristan and South Waziristan, is not simple. The agencies are dotted with militants, bandits, *mullahs* and leaders of *madrassahs* who vehemently oppose what they deem “modernization,” which really means encroaching on their authority. Even the Pakistani army has difficulty penetrating some cities in the Waziristan agencies, where the bulk of fighting is concentrated.

Fourthly, the bureaucracy in the Government of Pakistan and FATA is also a hindrance to USAID’s work. First of all, the Government of Pakistan has to approve the projects, then it must go through the NWFP’s provincial administration, after which it trickles down into the hands of the Political Agent who, as has been established, could be involved in rent-seeking opportunities that steer money away from the poor to the elite. Finally, the tribal *jirga* must approve any development projects before they can be implemented in an agency. Hence, a project can easily get sidetracked even before it has started.

Fifth, accountability has been a major issue; U.S. aid has come under criticism for not only being ineffective but also because most of it is diverted to unknown uses. A journalist from UK’s *The Guardian* reported, “Every month the Pakistani military submits expense claims averaging \$80m to the US embassy in Islamabad. No receipts

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<sup>273</sup> Feroz Ahmed, “Aiding Underdevelopment in Pakistan,” *MERIP Reports*, no. 42 (November 1975): 20.

are provided, and the money is paid directly into the Ministry of Finance.”<sup>274</sup> There is little record of how the cash money that is given to the Pakistan military for fighting rebels in the tribal areas is allocated, according to *The Guardian* report.

Sixth, there is also skepticism in the U.S. government about the large sums of money that are allocated to overhead costs in the form of consulting and contractor fees. USAID estimates overhead costs are around 30 percent of total aid.<sup>275</sup> “A regular complaint about USAid-funded contractors is that too much of the money that could be spent building a school or training teachers in the target country is instead spent on salaries of well-qualified experts and on overheads such as their offices in the US or Europe.”<sup>276</sup> However, Collier’s research had found that technical assistance that involved hiring consultants helped break key constraints in post-conflict situations and that it was the most effective type of aid during the first few years of the post-conflict period.<sup>277</sup> Indeed, USAID expertise has proven to be effective in some projects implemented in the provinces of Sindh and Baluchistan. However, it is difficult to gauge the effectiveness of foreign consultants in NWFP because thus far, there has been little work done in the FATA region. How effective foreign expertise will be remains to be seen.

Additionally, many politicians argue that some consultants are not in tune with reality. For example, schools built in FATA have to be earthquake-proof by U.S.

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<sup>274</sup> Declan Walsh, “Up to 70% of US aid to Pakistan ‘misspent,’” *The Guardian*, February 27, 2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/27/pakistan.usa>.

<sup>275</sup> Brajesh Upadhyay, “US aid ‘failing to reach target,’” BBC News, May 16, 2008, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/7405434.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7405434.stm).

<sup>276</sup> Ibid.

<sup>277</sup> Collier, *The Bottom Billion*, 20.

standards.<sup>278</sup> In a region where resources are few and far between to begin with, and outsiders are not welcomed by the locals, such costs are many times unnecessary. It might be more effective to quickly and more efficiently build a school that is not earthquake-proof than not build one at all because of lengthy construction requirements. Since FATA has largely been closed off to foreigners for centuries, there are not many experts familiar with the terrain and nature of the tribes. Local experts are hard to find because of lack of education and expertise. To help develop the economic infrastructure in the FATA, foreign consultants will need to work closely with locals to instill a balance between external and internal expertise.

A government report found that U.S. aid to Pakistan has not been met with success. “The United States has not met its national security goals to destroy terrorist threats and close the safe haven in Pakistan’s FATA... No comprehensive plan for meeting U.S. national security goals in the FATA has been developed, as stipulated by the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003).”<sup>279</sup> Goals are not clearly defined and there are no specifics as to *how* the planned projects will be carried out in FATA where the security situation is volatile. In such a scenario, it is worth pondering the effectiveness of aid.

The benefits and consequences of aid, as well as thoughts for future goals, will be discussed in the conclusion. But thus far, tangible results in the tribal areas have been few and far between, as the U.S. Government Accounting Office has

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<sup>278</sup> Upadhyay, “US aid ‘failing to reach target.’”

<sup>279</sup> General Accounting Office Reports & Testimony, “Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat,” May 1, 2008.



acknowledged, despite the seemingly impressive goals outlined by the U.S. and Pakistani governments. As one *BBC News* journalist stated, “The fact remains that the billions of dollars directed at winning hearts and minds and creating opportunities for locals seem to be missing their mark.”<sup>280</sup> The chief issue is that majority of the money is being funneled into the coffers of the Pakistani military, driving away resources from the poor. The bureaucratic nature of the Pakistani government also hinders aid flow. It is true that tribes have been resistance to many development projects, specifically that relate to women’s education schemes, but that does not mean they do not want to improve their living standards. The tribes have welcomed roads, electricity and communications infrastructure, and schools for boys. Past Members of National Assembly (MNAs) representing the tribal regions have requested more of such projects, but they have been met with little success.

#### *VI. The Pakistan Military*

There is no question that the institution that has benefited the most from the surge in U.S. aid is the Pakistani military, the world’s seventh largest standing army.<sup>281</sup> Initially, about 96 percent of U.S. aid went to the Pakistani military, with only 4 percent allocated for economic development of FATA, according to the U.S. Department of State.<sup>282</sup> Combined with all the development aid being filtered to Pakistan through USAID, the U.S. has provided \$1.9 billion since 2002 for security assistance, meaning to support, equip and train the armed forces of Pakistan. The

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<sup>280</sup> Upadhyay, “US aid ‘failing to reach target.’”

<sup>281</sup> *Asiamoney*, “Pakistan: The Dark Side,” November 28, 2007.

<sup>282</sup> US Fed News Service, “Statement by the US Department of State’s Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs,” Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2008.

2008 U.S. Defense Budget allots \$75 million to train and equip the paramilitary Frontier Corps.<sup>283</sup> The U.S. has, since 2001, spent \$25 million to equip the Frontier Corps, and officials say it could spend more than \$400 million in the next several years to continue this support, which includes building a training base in the NWFP.<sup>284</sup> The U.S. Government's Accountability Office noted that from October 2001 to June 2007, the U.S. reimbursed Pakistan \$5.6 billion in "Coalition Support Fund" for military operations in FATA.<sup>285</sup> According to one journalist, the money was reportedly used to pay for "heavy equipment better suited for a regional conflict with India rather than to fight the insurgents in Waziristan."<sup>286</sup> Pakistan's defense budget for 2008-09 is expected to reach \$43 million (Rs. 3 billion), more than 15 percent of the total budget.<sup>287</sup>

Pakistan's military not only controls the security infrastructure, it has deep stakes in the country's economy as well. The military owns everything from cement firms to construction conglomerates to cornflake manufacturers to bakeries.<sup>288</sup> Author Ayesha Siddiqi put the army's net worth at more than \$20 billion, roughly four times

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<sup>283</sup> John Barry, Zahid Hussain and Ron Moreau, "The General's New Mission," *Newsweek*, February 18, 2008, 44.

<sup>284</sup> Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, "U.S. Plan Widens Role in Training Pakistani Forces in Qaeda Battle," *The New York Times*, March 2, 2008.  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/02/world/asia/02military.html?pagewanted=1&sq=pentagon%20and%20waziristan&st=nyt&scp=1>.

<sup>285</sup> Anjum Ibrahim, "Why US Matters So Much to Our Politicians and Military," *Business Recorder*, May 12, 2008.

<sup>286</sup> Ibid.

<sup>287</sup> Pakistani Ministry of Finance, "Budget in Brief," June 11, 2008.  
<http://www.finance.gov.pk/admin/images/budget/budgetbrief.pdf>.

<sup>288</sup> *Asiamoney*, "Pakistan: The Dark Side."

the total foreign direct investment into Pakistan in 2006.<sup>289</sup> She estimates that more than 11 percent of state land is owned by the military, and the combined wealth of the leading generals is \$7 billion.

The military historically served as the country's protector and unifier in times of international crisis, whether it was the Bangladesh secession war, conflict with India or support of Afghan *mujahideen*. But in the last ten years, the military's credibility has been damaged amid opposition against Musharraf, who resigned in August 2008. Critics of the military argued that if less U.S. aid got diverted toward military resources and more toward rebuilding the economy of the FATA in the earlier stages of the "war on terror," the conflict would not have escalated. As journalist Sharif Shuja said, "The Pakistani army, as an institution, has been a major obstacle to promoting better governance and development. With defence devouring a major portion of the budget, key sectors like health and education have been squeezed, and more and more ordinary people continue to fall below the poverty line."<sup>290</sup>

Military aid has had several consequences. First, the high level of support to Pakistan has done little to strengthen relations between it and the U.S. Many U.S. politicians got agitated with Musharraf for not doing enough to combat terrorism. At the same time, the Pakistani government that was elected in February 2008 has adopted the strategy of talking with the militants and has pulled out troops from the

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<sup>289</sup> Ayesha Siddiqi, *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy*, (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 220.

<sup>290</sup> Sharif Shuja, "The Sources of Pakistan's Insecurity," *Contemporary Review* 289, no. 1685 (Summer 2007): 220.

region, even going as far as to allow rebels to continue imposing *shariah* law in Swat in return for stability. This plan has come under even more criticism than Musharraf's tactics. U.S. politicians feel that there should be more tangible results in the tribal areas, given its level of aid and combat support to Pakistan. At the same time, Pakistani politicians, including Musharraf, are facing mounting pressure from Pakistanis, among which anti-Americanism has grown in the last decade and who feel that the war in Waziristan is not theirs to fight.

Secondly, the increase in Pakistani military activities has done little to curb military activities by the violence entrepreneurs; rather it has given a further cause to the violence entrepreneurs to rally about. Collier and his colleagues argue that civil war is often followed by an increase in the government's military budget. Instead of curbing the conflict, this usually results in violence entrepreneurs also upping their activities in retaliation.

In Waziristan, militants have only strengthened and expanded their activities since 2001 despite the upsurge in Pakistan's military budget. Military incursions into the region have done little to create peace; instead the fighting has led to an increase in the number of casualties and displaced civilians, showing that it will take more than tanks and bombs to solve the crisis. As a report by Crisis Group stated, "Badly planned, poorly conducted military operations are also responsible for the militancy in the tribal belt, where the loss of lives and property and displacement of thousands of civilians have alienated the population... The use of indiscriminate and excessive

force undermined the military's local standing."<sup>291</sup> An editorial in *The Economist* added, "Seen locally as an invading army, this has inspired fanatical resistance, undermined the civil administration in Waziristan, and helped spread Taliban rule outside the tribal areas and into NWFP itself."<sup>292</sup>

Thirdly, U.S. aid has created rifts within the Pakistani military itself. The Pakistani army is filled with Cold War-era generals who still hold sympathy for the Taliban and what they see as the Islamicist struggle against Western domination. In contrast, many leaders are pro-Western, such as Musharraf's successor in the military, Vice-Chief of Army Staff, Ashfaq Kiyani. As a recent *Newsweek* article stated, "Aid alone won't solve the worst weakness of the Pakistani Army: its conservative, old-school command culture. Kayani can't afford for his fellow officers or the civilian public to think he's too close to the Americans... The last thing Kayani needs now is a bunch of camouflage-painted American Rambos running around Waziristan."<sup>293</sup>

Additionally, between 20 and 25 percent of the Pakistani military is Pashtun who are putting additional pressure on the government to curb military activities in FATA.<sup>294</sup> This combination of sympathy for the rebels, anti-Americanism and pro-Westernism means that many military incursions are only half-hearted, giving little ground for success.

In addition to the military, the conflict in Waziristan and the swarm of U.S. aid has divided the Pakistani people as well. Many Pakistanis feel that the U.S. only

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<sup>291</sup> The Crisis Group, *Pakistan's Tribal Areas*, 15.

<sup>292</sup> *Economist*, "Asia: Taliban All Over," 61.

<sup>293</sup> Barry, Hussain and Moreau, "The General's New Mission," 44.

<sup>294</sup> Shuja, "The Sources of Pakistan's Insecurity," 220.

supports them in times of crisis and abandons them when its work is done, as was the case in the Afghan-Soviet war, while others feel that U.S. support is valuable to Pakistan's economy. Pakistanis are also divided about what tactics the Government of Pakistan should adopt to solve the crisis in Waziristan. Sympathy toward Islamicists and *jihadis*, along with a more radical ideology, has increased as people view the U.S. as the main threat. As an editorial in a Pakistani newspaper said, "Patriotic tribesmen who have guarded the western marches for sixty years free of cost have been alienated through repeated military operations conducted in pursuit of the USA's War on Terror."<sup>295</sup> U.S. aid givers have not been viewed as benevolent, charitable organizations as the administration had hoped. Rather, Pakistanis feel that Americans are using their soil to wage their wars. "There is a perception that the renewed friendship is being driven *solely* by America's need for Pakistani cooperation in the 'War on Terrorism,'" which has only increased discontent toward Americans.<sup>296</sup> Many reporters have gone as far as to dub the U.S.' involvement an "invasion of its own kind."<sup>297</sup> On the other hand, many Pakistanis are in favor of the military excursions and favor U.S. support to curb extremism.<sup>298</sup>

The U.S. government has complained that its aid has had little tangible results in rooting out "terrorists" and/or Al-Qaeda, the leaders of which many U.S. policymakers claim are being sheltered in the mountains of Waziristan. Despite their economic growth, Pakistan and Afghanistan continue to be regarded among the

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<sup>295</sup> *The Nation*, "Iqbal Day," November 8, 2007.

<sup>296</sup> Gilani, "US-Pakistan Relations: The Way Forward," 100.

<sup>297</sup> Shafi Khan, "The Enemies – Right in Front," *The Nation*, August 26, 2007.

<sup>298</sup> Editorials in *The News*, a leading English-language daily newspaper in Pakistan, have been on the forefront.

world's top Failed States.<sup>299</sup> The U.S. government is divided about where and how to allocate its resources, and many politicians' are questioning the large sums of aid to Pakistan, including presidential hopefuls Barack Obama and John McCain.

The conflict in Waziristan has had detrimental consequences on the lives of civilians, especially the elderly, children and women. More than 250,000 internally displaced people have thus far moved to cities to escape the fighting. The worsening of the security situation in FATA, displacement of people and strengthening of the Taliban movement has shown that the U.S. and Pakistani governments have not understood the culture, social structures and organization, and the ideology of the people. The British put much effort, including people, time and money into understanding the norms and values of the tribes and despite their hard work, they had little success in maintaining consistent peace in the tribal areas. The U.S. and Pakistanis both have a lesson to learn from the mistakes and achievements of the British.

In addition, the stereotypes and misperceptions about the tribes that were created during the British continue to this day because of lack of knowledge about tribal customs. Until that perception is changed and understood, neither Pakistanis nor Americans will be able to make headway into FATA. Until policymakers move beyond the "tribal-ness" of FATA ,and really begin understanding and discussing how to change ordinary people's lives by working closely with them to change the

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<sup>299</sup> Pakistan ranked twelfth and Afghanistan eighth on The Fund for Peace's "Failed States Index 2007." The index is based on a country's vulnerability to violent internal conflict and social deterioration. For full criteria and assessment report, see <http://www.fundforpeace.org>.

mindset and instill more literacy, neither military tactics nor current development plans will work. The “Us” versus “Them” attitude has to change to yield positive results.



## **Chapter Four**

### **Consequences of Conflict - Women**

*“Women victimized by conflict cannot avail themselves of even the basics of human survival, and world institutions have failed to protect them from the most fundamental human rights violations.”*

Sima Wali, Elizabeth Gould and Patrick Fitzgerald<sup>300</sup>

The conflict in Waziristan that started in 2002 has had dire consequences on the social order. From the elderly to children, the conflict has had pernicious effects on the most powerless groups in society. This thesis will shed light on one of those groups – women. The role of women in Waziristan is limited to household chores and rearing children and/or livestock. Only the poorest women are involved in activities requiring them to leave the house. Yet, women play an important role in the acculturation process of children and are vital in maintaining the familial structure. In the current conflict, they are both aggressors and victims.

There is virtually no academic literature specifically about the women of Waziristan and even writings about females in FATA are scanty. Therefore, this research is important because it sheds light on the plight of women in the historical and economic context and furthers the existing literature in this arena. It also examines how women are affected by, and contribute to, conflict and war in FATA, a topic that has not been analyzed.

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<sup>300</sup> Sima Wali was president of Refugee Women in Development (RefWID). Elizabeth Gould and Paul Fitzgerald are journalists who reported from Afghanistan. See Sima Wali, Elizabeth Gould and Paul Fitzgerald, “The Impact of Political Conflict on Women: The Case of Afghanistan,” *American Journal of Public Health* (October 1999): 313.

Some of the most in-depth analysis about Pashtun women is found in the works of anthropologists Benedicte Grima and Amineh Ahmed. Both women conducted research outside FATA but shed valuable insight about the everyday life of Pashtun women which can be applied to the Pashtun community around Pakistan. This chapter will assess the role of women in the greater Pashtun society, and analyze it in the context of the current conflict.

### I. Statistics

The Government of Pakistan estimates that the female population in FATA is approximately 1.5 million, or 2.4 percent of the national figure.<sup>301</sup> The men to women ratio is nearly 1:1. Only 3 percent of women in FATA are literate, compared to the national average of 32.6 percent. This does not come as a surprise, since there are only 18 high schools for women, and no colleges. Only 4 percent of all women in FATA are enrolled in schools. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) estimated in 2007 that six out of ten girls enrolled in primary schools, but very few completed it. In some districts, nine out of ten girls left school after fifth grade.<sup>302</sup>

### II. Gender Construction

Gender relations in the tribal areas differ greatly from those in the rest of Pakistan. In the male-dominated Waziristan society, women are considered inferior to men. They are generally seen as weak and in need of control by men, to the point that

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<sup>301</sup> Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, "Statistical Abstract of F.A.T.A.,".

<sup>302</sup> Maryam Bibi and Antonia Paradela, interview by Jenni Murray, *Woman's Hour*, BBC, February 22, 2007, [http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/womanshour/01/2007\\_08\\_thu.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/womanshour/01/2007_08_thu.shtml).

in some areas, lack of male relatives is equivalent to being poor.<sup>303</sup> A woman's birth is not celebrated, they enjoy few rights, and they do not inherit land or property.<sup>304</sup>

Male life begins with the shooting of guns, cries of joy, days of visiting, and congratulations and gift bearing to the mother. Female life opens with a sigh, or even tears. One cannot generally classify birth as a *xadi* (joy or festivity), because it is most often spoken of as a *gham* (grief or sadness) in the case of a girl's birth... This gender schism, which begins with birth, grows more intense with each stage of growth and development until women's lives and culture are clearly separate from men's.<sup>305</sup>

A bride's price is negotiated to this day and collected when girls are married and most of it is kept by the father.<sup>306</sup> Women's main tasks are to cook, collect firewood, and look after the house, children and livestock. "Their spare, lean bodies, their bare or cheap rubber-shod feet, and their lined faces speak of a physically hard life, as one sees them walking along the roads with bundles of firewood on their heads."<sup>307</sup> Anthropologist Benedicte Grima, who conducted extensive research on the role of emotion among Pashtun women in poor classes, said that a woman earns respect and reputation by the amount of hardship and suffering she endures.<sup>308</sup> *Gham* and suffering is an integral part of feminine identity. Anthropologist Amineh Ahmed argued that Pashtun women's lives are not totally immersed in *gham*, but that it is an important element in women's lives.

In Pakistan, women are slowly entering politics and making headway in various fields. However, gender discrimination in FATA is deeper than any other

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<sup>303</sup> Grima, *The Performance of Emotion Among Paxtun Women*, 124.

<sup>304</sup> Ahmed, *Resistance and Control in Pakistan*, 26.

<sup>305</sup> Grima, *The Performance of Emotion Among Paxtun Women*, 50.

<sup>306</sup> Ahmed, *Resistance and Control in Pakistan*, 26.

<sup>307</sup> Ibid.

<sup>308</sup> Grima, *The Performance of Emotion Among Paxtun Women*, 13.

region in Pakistan. Women in Waziristan and in the conservative Pashtun societies across the Frontier are considered a symbol of men's honor. This honor is what defines the individual and must be kept by a woman to avoid shaming herself and her family.<sup>309</sup> Partaking in the company of men, working or going out without *purdah*<sup>310</sup> are considered dishonorable and shameful. *Purdah* means veiling and covering oneself from other's eyes. Akbar Ahmed described it as "seclusion, modesty of women."<sup>311</sup> As Benedicte Grima wrote, "For many Paxtun women, leaving the house without a large outdoor veil is as unheard of as streaking is in the United States. The veil is the dominant symbol of the female sphere and all the behavior expected to go with it, such as *sharm*." Men are generally prohibited from being in the company of women who are not close relatives.<sup>312</sup> *Tor*, which involves upholding female honor, is just as important of a concept in *Pukhtunwali* as courage (*tora*), revenge (*badal*) and hospitality (*melmastia*).<sup>313</sup> "Women are not just victims of violence but are also seen as symbols of communal identities and relations between men and women; the proper role for women in society has become the terrain on which broader issues of differences in economic, political and social power are being fought."<sup>314</sup>

In Waziristan, a woman's honor has instigated generation-long blood feuds and intra-tribal rivalry. "They (honor and shame) are key to social acceptance within,

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<sup>309</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>310</sup> The richer a Pashtun family, the more emphasis on the veil, as poorer women are sometimes forced to go out without full *purdah* for work or family. See Amineh Ahmed, *Sorrow and Joy Among Muslim Women: The Pukhtuns of Northern Pakistan*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

<sup>311</sup> Ahmed, *Resistance and Control in Pakistan*, 166.

<sup>312</sup> Grima, *The Performance of Emotion Among Paxtun Women*, 16.

<sup>313</sup> Ahmed's translation for *tor* is "black." When the woman is dishonored, both male and female are *tor*. See Ahmed, *Resistance and Control in Pakistan*, 24, 167.

<sup>314</sup> Kamla Bhasin, Ritu Menon and Nighat S. Khan, eds., *Against All Odds: Essays on Women, Religion and Development from India and Pakistan*, (New Delhi: Pauls Press, 1994), 1.

and protection by, the community.”<sup>315</sup> A woman’s behavior represents the whole family’s honor and reputation. It is an important part of a Pashtun man’s honor; hence, a woman must behave so as to preserve her family’s reputation.

*Badal*, meaning exchange or reciprocity, is also an important concept in Pashtun women’s lives.<sup>316</sup> Many women who spent time with Benedicte Grima told her that everything in their lives is about *badal*, whether it is the bride price or honor.

Like the Pakistani society, there is no separation between the public and private sphere in the Pashtun culture. There is little, if no, emphasis on personal enrichment, only how one’s behavior impacts family and society. Anthropologist Benedicte Grima wrote:

Every interaction, or social exchange, consists of a public act, an act for which the actor is responsible toward an audience, whether it consists of one or one hundred people... Unlike Americans, who, in widening the gap between self and society, devote much time and energy to promoting and examining the personal and individual self through self-analysis, Paxtuns strive to close the gap between culture and the individual. Thus, we will see *hal wayel* (speaking of the inner state) spoken of as socially incorrect.<sup>317</sup>

A Pashtun woman must suppress her inner emotions and has to make all behavior conform to society’s norms. Women’s social interaction is limited to social gatherings and events. Even these get-togethers are not for leisure; they usually involve an event such as a wedding or funeral. Additionally, women generally do not have access to public spaces such as parks or restaurants. They are not allowed to participate in the *jirga* or any such institution considered men’s domain.

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<sup>315</sup> Grima, *The Performance of Emotion Among Paxtun Women*, 5.

<sup>316</sup> Ibid., 72.

<sup>317</sup> Ibid., 8.

According to Benedicte Grima, Pashtun code requires women to bear their hardships with patience and virtue. They cannot run away from their men even if they are abusive. Amid economic woes such as poverty and lack of running water and electricity, women are also commonly victims of domestic abuse by their husbands and in-laws; their life involves constant pressures, first getting married and fetching a good price and then bearing children and maintaining the family's honor.<sup>318</sup> They are judged on the basis of the hardships they have endured, but also by their morality and virtues.<sup>319</sup> Women who escape abusive relationships are usually shunned by the society.

Table 8– Conceptualizing Gender

<b>Men's Paxto</b>		
	<i>Aggression</i>	<i>Maintenance of Relations</i>
	<i>Gherat</i> (honor)	
Individual	Gun, turban	<i>Saritob</i> (being a man)
	<i>Badal</i> (exchange, revenge)	
Group	Feud, blood revenge	Hospitality, granting exile

<b>Women's Paxto</b>		
	<i>Aggression</i>	<i>Maintenance of Relations</i>
	<i>Gherat</i> (honor)	
Individual	NA	Shame, modesty, tears
	<i>Badal</i> (exchange, revenge)	
Group	Upping the ante	<i>Gham-xadi</i> (grief-joy), <i>tapos</i> (mandatory visit of inquiry about someone who is ill or suffering), gifts

Source: Benedicte Grima, *The Performance of Emotion Among Paxtun Women*, 1995.

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<sup>318</sup> Ibid., 132.

<sup>319</sup> Ibid., 39.

One reporter's encounter with women in Waziristan summed up their experience:

Eventually, we passed two old women carrying enormous bundles of wood on their heads. They stared at us. We stopped the truck. The women, chuckling, climbed into its bed. As we made our way back down the mountain, they shrieked at every lurch. "They've never ridden in a vehicle before," my friend said, looking in the rearview mirror.<sup>320</sup>

### III. Evolution of Cultural Norms

Women's role and place in society is often cloaked in religious terms, even though many academics have argued that it is simply cultural norms that suppress females in Waziristan. For example, Benedicte Grima wrote about how little Pashtun women are involved in their marriage and in choosing their partner. According to the Islamic *shariah*, a woman can turn down the marriage partner, but according to *rewaj* (custom), she cannot.<sup>321</sup> A second example is that women's rights in Islam in the case of divorce are nonexistent in Pashtun society. *Haq mehr* (a pre-determined amount of money a man grants a woman after divorce) is not granted or required because of the honor involved.<sup>322</sup> Similarly, Islam allows a woman to divorce her husband but this is a "social impossibility" in the Pashtun society.<sup>323</sup> The line between *Pukhtunwali* and *shariah* is often blurred.<sup>324</sup> Islamic ideas of segregation have been taken many steps further in the Pashtun community in which women's circulation is controlled.<sup>325</sup>

At the same time, Islam is an important facet of women's lives and it must be so understood to comprehend the complexity of the society. As editors of a book

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<sup>320</sup> Griswold, "In the Hiding Zone."

<sup>321</sup> Grima, *The Performance of Emotion Among Paxtun Women*, 54.

<sup>322</sup> Ahmed, *Pukhtun Economy and Society*, 250.

<sup>323</sup> Ibid.

<sup>324</sup> Rashid, *Taliban*, 112.

<sup>325</sup> Grima, *The Performance of Emotion Among Paxtun Women*, 91.

compiled by South Asian NGOs wrote: “We have to move beyond the conventional rejection of religion as ‘false consciousness,’ because we are often interacting with women for whom it is an article of faith, in spite of their experience of its oppression.”<sup>326</sup> In a society that does not distinguish between cultural norms and religion, women accept and fulfill those duties that are expected of and assigned to them. Many see religion as their “salvation,” even if they may be oppressed by its interpretation.<sup>327</sup> One urban women’s group that advocates a sense of religiosity is Al-Huda Women’s Movement, which aims to revive Islamic ideas especially among urban Pashtun women. The difference between women in such groups and those in tribal areas is that the former questions Pashtun practices that are part of *rewaj* (custom), not Islam.

#### IV. Women as Aggressors

In a society where women have little say about how they live their lives, they are expected to side with their husbands and fathers in their decisions. Women often forge friendships to promote their family’s political motives and act as mediators for family relationships.<sup>328</sup> As anthropologist Amineh Ahmed stated, *bibiane* (a respect title for a woman from a wealthy family) work analogously with their husbands’ political motives and play a big part in boosting their careers.<sup>329</sup> At the same time, women have also played a crucial role in impacting their family’s choices and have supported many small-scale conflicts that have erupted on the Frontier over the

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<sup>326</sup> Bhasin, Menon and Khan, eds., *Against All Odds*, vii.

<sup>327</sup> Ibid.

<sup>328</sup> Grima, *The Performance of Emotion Among Paxtun Women*, 89.

<sup>329</sup> Ahmed, *Sorrow and Joy Among Muslim Women*, 12.



course of history. For example, the Mullah of Waziristan gained prominence in the early 1970s in large part because of women who absorbed his conservative ideologies through religious gatherings and spread them to their networks as well as to their families. A woman's network constitutes of her own family, her friends, her fellow tribeswomen and relatives.

Pakistan Television (PTV) reports have often pointed to women fighters in the FATA region. Women have been used as human shields, and they have fought with militants against the army.<sup>330</sup> While this may seem unusual, given their traditional roles, the norm that a woman must support her husbands' and sons' decisions explains their role as aggressors in the conflict. Women are also just as prone to religious rhetoric as their male counterparts. An example of this would be the siege of *Lal Masjid* (Red Mosque) in 2007 by religious militants proclaiming they wanted to establish a stricter interpretation of the *shariah* law in Islamabad; many of the rebels in that event were *burkha*-clad women who stormed a nearby children's library and burned books.

#### V. Women as Victims

Other agencies and districts, such as Swat, where cultural norms toward women were more relaxed than in Waziristan, have felt a severe blow after the infiltration of pro-Taliban violence entrepreneurs. In Waziristan agencies, the militants have cemented an already-rigid societal structure in which women were granted few luxuries. They have imposed Taliban-style *shariah* law in which women

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<sup>330</sup> *BBC Monitoring South Asia*, "Pakistan TV Carries Military Spokesman's Statement on Waziristan Operation," July 17, 2005.

without *burkha* are subjected to penalties and possibly, beatings. *Burkha* is a covering of women which hides them from head to toe, with only their eyes visible. For many women, it symbolizes the separation of men's and women's spheres. The Taliban made the *burkha* mandatory for women when they began their ascent to power in Afghanistan in the early 1990s.

Among harsher laws such as closing down female schools, cutting down female hospitals, the Taliban in Afghanistan banned women from wearing high heels, making a noise with their shoes while they walked or wearing makeup. This has specifically impacted poor women who, despite the strict *Pukhtunwali* code, were still forced to leave their home to fetch water, help in agricultural activities or trade. The strengthening of the militant movement has made work for women even tougher. In addition to making the *burkha* mandatory, in June 2008, The Tehrik-i-Taliban branch in the Mohmand Agency reportedly prohibited women from working in the fields, attending marriage ceremonies (a critical *xadi* event in women's limited social network), and visiting markets and doctors without a male escort.<sup>331</sup> They also announced a penalty for the male relatives of women who refused to follow *purdah*.

Violence entrepreneurs have also attempted to block aid designated for women. In late 2007, local Taliban groups seized and burned thousands of kilograms of food destined for pregnant women to a hospital in South Waziristan.<sup>332</sup> The food was provided for expectant women suffering from malnutrition by a Western NGO.

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<sup>331</sup> South Asia Terrorism Portal, "FATA Timeline – 2008,"

<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Waziristan/timeline/index.html#>.

<sup>332</sup> *Daily Times*, "Taliban Burn Aid Agency Food: Officials," November, 26, 2007, <http://www.global-sisterhood-network.org/content/view/1976/59/>.

The militants claimed that foreign NGOs wanted to harm future generations, hence they destroyed the food.<sup>333</sup>

The conflict has also taken away men from households, leaving women to fend for themselves and to support their families. Another impact of the conflict has been that the hostile climate and lack of security has kept NGOs from venturing into Waziristan, which means there is little outside economic help for such women. War also diverts already-scarce resources away from women. “Poverty and unequal access to resources are often at the heart of women’s neglect and abuse, and this is especially true in war economies. Resources such as food and medical attention are often withheld from women and directed to male soldiers.”<sup>334</sup>

Additionally, women are also living in fear of their male teenage children being abducted by militants from their homes.<sup>335</sup> Many of these children are trained to become suicide bombers and indoctrinated into the militants’ radical ideology. Some families have had to pay as much as 50,000 rupees (about \$1,000) to secure the release of their children; most others who do not have access to such a high sum of money have not been able to challenge the extremists who need human capital to fight their rebellion.<sup>336</sup> For women, who rely deeply on their sons for material and emotional support, the abduction of children can have a devastating impact.

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<sup>333</sup> Ibid.

<sup>334</sup> Wali, Gould and Fitzgerald, “The Impact of Conflict on Women,” 312.

<sup>335</sup> Ashfaq Yusufzai, “Parents Say Islamists are Stealing Sons,” *Inter Press Service*, April 6, 2007.

<sup>336</sup> Ibid.

## VI. Gender Inequality

The issue of how women are treated in the tribal areas is not just a societal issue, it is also about human rights, including the basic right to freedom. Until it is looked upon that way not only in Waziristan, but also greater Pakistan, there is little hope for progress. Anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod argued that aid workers must not view these women with a sense of superiority because until they understand cultural norms and how they are enforced, progress is unattainable. What should be done by governments involved in the Waziristan conflict is to take a look at their own policies and see how they are impacting women and children.

Abu-Lughod said it is important to be aware of differences in societies, and to promote women's development by being respectful of alternative paths toward social change that might give women better lives.<sup>337</sup> The Government of Pakistan has done little to provide the FATA agencies with schools, teachers and institutions. Maternal health care is in just as much of a despicable shape. Until basic services to women are improved and institutions set up to provide women safety from abuses, females in the tribal Pashtun society have few opportunities to move beyond their present distressing condition.

The situation in the tribal areas is complex because men in power are strongly against women's schooling and, in many cases, modern health measures.

Nevertheless, it is important to create awareness about what basic education can do to

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<sup>337</sup> Lila Abu-Lughod, "Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections in Cultural Relativism and Its Others," in *Feminist Frontiers*, 7<sup>th</sup> ed., (New York: McGraw Hill, 2007), 484-492.

not only raise the quality of women's lives, but that of their families and the wider society. By working closely with tribes, such measures are not impossible, as has been proven before. One example is that of Dr. Begum Jan, a Pashtun doctor and women's rights activist who heads the Tribal Women Welfare Association (TWWA), an organization with the goal of empowering women in FATA. She has established 11 centers across the region to provide medical training to women.<sup>338</sup> Jan has reiterated that aid coming to Pakistan for the tribal areas rarely reaches the group it is designated for, and lack of economic opportunities and high illiteracy make the FATA agencies more vulnerable to Taliban propaganda.<sup>339</sup> Another group is Khwendo Kher (Sister's Home), an NGO started by Maryam Bibi that aims to increase literacy rate among Pashtun women.<sup>340</sup> Since 1993, the organization has registered 10,000 girls in its schools.<sup>341</sup> It is important for the Government of Pakistan, USAID and other NGOs that aim to improve women's situation in FATA to work with organizations such as the TWWA and Khwendo Khel, and employ their expertise to assess how women's education and health measures can be expanded.

Security is also an important feature and currently, the conditions are precarious for men and worse for women. When men join violence entrepreneurs or are killed, there is little protection for women in society. As was the case in Afghanistan, the conflict in the tribal areas of Pakistan raises the chance of violent

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<sup>338</sup> Anwar Iqbal, "Fata Woman Received Courage Award," March 11, 2008, <http://www.dawn.com/2008/03/11/top8.htm>.

<sup>339</sup> Jane Morse, "Pakistani Woman Finds Education Can be Politically Dangerous," March 10, 2008, <http://www.america.gov/st/hr-english/2008/March/20080310120345ajesrom0.1742212.html>.

<sup>340</sup> Khwendo Kher, Women and Children Development Programme, <http://www.khwendokor.org.pk/index.html>.

<sup>341</sup> Maryam Bibi and Antonia Paradela, interview, BBC.

crimes against women, including rape, theft and murders. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP)'s 1994 Human Development Report described human security as a necessary condition to peace. It stated: "The world can never be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives. The search for security in such a milieu lies in development, not in arms."<sup>342</sup>

History has important lessons for current policymakers, if they choose to heed them. One does not have to look far to see what disastrous effects war can have on the social and moral fabric of society. As journalist Ahmed Rashid pointed out: "Twenty years of continuous warfare has destroyed Afghan civil society, the clan community and family structure which provided an important cushion of relief in an otherwise harsh economic landscape... When Kabul's women looked at themselves in the mirror, even before the Taliban captured the city, they saw only despair."<sup>343</sup> Women in Afghanistan enjoyed much more freedom than their tribal counterparts before the advent of the Taliban. Years of war destroyed Afghanistan's educational system and while education statistics have improved in recent years, the country is still recovering from what it lost during years of conflict. Despite the rise in educational levels, the country is not anywhere near what it would have been had it not experienced a series of conflicts, the legacy of which will take a long time to eradicate. If Pakistanis, Americans and the militants do not take a lesson from the havoc created in Afghanistan after years of bloody wars, Waziristan could face the same dark predicament with even worse consequences. Women already form the

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<sup>342</sup> Quoted in Wali, Gould and Fitzgerald, "The Impact of Political Conflict on Women," 314.

<sup>343</sup> Rashid, *Taliban*, 107-108.

most marginalized group in the tribal society, and further erosion of their families, homes and lands because of the ongoing conflict would only worsen their situation rather than improve it.

## **Chapter Five**

### **Conclusion**

*“No man who has read a page of Indian history  
will ever prophesy about the frontier.”*

Lord Curzon, Freedom of City of London Speech. 20 July, 1904<sup>344</sup>

Waziristan has had a long and turbulent history. For nearly a century, the British tried to tame the warrior tribes through various policies and strategies. First, they took the approach that non-interference would allow the tribes to keep their way of life and hence, not affect the rest of the India. That changed as sour relations and a subsequent war with the Afghans made British lawmakers realize that they needed a more coherent policy for the tribes, who served as gatekeepers of the northwest borders of India. The Great Game and the concern about Russia's advances to India played a significant role in shaping the Raj's policy. Many British lawmakers were convinced that Russia was on a mission to take over Central Asia, and could pose a threat to Britain's Indian Empire if not checked. To secure their power and legitimacy, the British tried to establish relations with the Afghanistan and the tribes, many of whom were paid allowances by the Amir. By the time they left the subcontinent in 1947, the British had at least fought four bloody wars with the Afghans and several small-scale and major wars with the tribes.

Following the creation of Pakistan in 1947, the government, more preoccupied with Kashmir and its eastern border with India, chose to leave the tribes on their own. Calls for an independent *Pukhtunistan* were stifled by paying allowances to the tribes

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<sup>344</sup> Davies, *The North-West Frontier*, 174.



to remain within Pakistan's boundaries. Yet, the Government of Pakistan never enforced its laws and regulations on the tribes, allowing them to settle their own disputes through the tribal *jirga*. Women's situation, which has improved slightly in the rest of the country, remains very much the same in the tribal areas as it was during the time of the British rule. Communications infrastructure is weak and schools are few and far away. The only roads some cities have are ones that were once built by the British prior to partition. It is not uncommon to still find people in the Frontier traveling by donkey as only the elite can afford to keep cars. Families still live in mud houses. The *maliks*, prior to the advent of the Taliban, lived in large complexes that included their own private mosque, but the organizational structure of the tribal community has changed considerably since the violence entrepreneurs have come to power.

The Afghan Taliban were ethnic Pashtuns who were regarded by many as fighting Islam's holy war. The Taliban movements that have spun out from FATA today are true to the same ideology. They claim they want to see an Islamic state with strict enforcement of *shariah* law. They have banned books and movies, set fire to music and movie shops and made the *burkha* mandatory for women. In Waziristan, women enjoyed few rights and there has not been any history of poetry and music, like other Pashtun regions. But many other parts of FATA and the settled areas had a rich culture and tradition of poetry, education, culture and oral history. One example is the valley of Swat to the east of FATA. The city was popular for its tourism and development of women's education sector. The wave of current militancy threatens to

wipe out the progress and traditions of these areas. The current conflict has destroyed an already weak infrastructure. Violence entrepreneurs are radicalizing young Pashtun boys into their ideology. Meanwhile, many elders and women are being forced to flee from their homes in fear of killings by the militants and concern about aerial bombardment by Pakistani and U.S. governments. The Pakistani military, for the most part, has been relying on air attacks because it is unable to infiltrate through the mountainous terrain to get rid of the militants. The Taliban have been retaliating with rocket-propelled grenades, machine-gun fire and roadside bombs. Even the Frontier Corps, members of which are selected from various tribes, have been brutally attacked by violence entrepreneurs.<sup>345</sup> The Taliban are reported to be digging trenches to encircle towns and overrun them.<sup>346</sup> The *New York Times* described the scene in one FATA town where government and Taliban are involved in heavy fighting.

Residents of Khar and the nearby town of Loe Sam were forced to escape on foot, and then hitched rides on whatever transportation they could find, said Maroof Shah, 40, a farmer from Loe Sam. The 23 members of his extended family climbed into a truck taking onions to market in Peshawar, he said... Many women and children had difficulty crossing rivers swollen with recent rains, and some drowned as they tried to flee, he said.<sup>347</sup>

### I. Filling a Vacuum

The FATA region is one of Pakistan's most economically impoverished areas. Education rates are low because of a lack of schooling facilities, male hostility to women's education; hospitals are few and without adequate care and there are few industries or jobs to keep tribesmen busy. Many rear sheep and cattle or are involved

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<sup>345</sup> Perlez and Shah, "13 Killed in Attack on a Bus in Pakistan," *New York Times*.

<sup>346</sup> Ibid.

<sup>347</sup> Ibid.

in farming activities, which have dried up since the beginning of the conflict. The one trade activity that has been booming is that of drugs and arms. FATA serves as the transit route between Afghanistan, the world's largest opium producer, and the rest of the world. But the drug trade has little direct beneficial impact on the general public. It is concentrated in the hands of the drug barons, most of whom are part of the Taliban movements and fund the militancy against the government.

The Pashtun are a proud people who have always resisted what they deemed outside influences. But the Taliban, both that ruled Afghanistan and those that are part of the current war, are homegrown. These young violence entrepreneurs hail from the tribes. Many of them are Mahsuds, the one tribe that the British found most difficult to control. As one tribe gains more power, it subdues other tribes, a phenomenon which has recurred through history. But this time, the conflict is not bound to FATA alone. It impacts the stability of Pakistan, which is being challenged by the rise of radical ideologies around the country. It also affects the U.S., which believes that the "war on terror" cannot be won without rooting out Al-Qaeda which they suspect is hiding in the tribal areas, most probably in one of the Waziristan agencies.

The USAID has defined several programs which it plans to implement in FATA. But until the security situation is resolved, USAID and even Pakistani aid workers are unlikely to be able to enter those areas.

Caroe believed strongly that development schemes in FATA would help both the tribes and the state of Pakistan. He felt that the British had been successful in

keeping Baluchistan tribes content by implementing economic reforms, including infrastructure and schools. Journalist and author Ahmed Rashid has been voicing the same opinion 60 years after the British left the Indian subcontinent. “The vacuum (that has led Islamic radicalism to flourish) has been created by the lack of effective state controls, the deprivation of the people and the lack of opportunities such as in education and jobs.”<sup>348</sup>

## II. Conflict Costs

One of the chief costs of the conflict is the decline in public trust, both toward the Pakistani government and local chiefs. Mohammed Khan, a resident of the tribal areas, fled with four of his six children, and an extended family of 18. He said he was opposed to the Taliban at first. As he was escaping from his native village of Sadiq Abad, he asked for protection at a government compound but was told it was for government officials only. “Today we are homeless, shelterless and without education for our children,” he said.<sup>349</sup> Tribesmen who do not side with the Taliban feel like they have no help from the Government of Pakistan in rooting out terrorists. The government’s military build-up, arbitrary arrests of civilians and search operations, as well as the intense army action against foreign militants in Waziristan for the last six years has made locals wary of the government’s motives. “Seen locally as an invading army, this has inspired fanatical resistance, undermined the civil

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<sup>348</sup> *BBC News*, “Militancy Will Not Run out of Steam,” August 4, 2008.  
[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/7530272.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7530272.stm).

<sup>349</sup> Perlez and Shah, “Taliban Force Pakistani Troops from Tribal Areas,” *New York Times*.

administration in Waziristan, and helped spread Taliban rule outside the tribal areas and into NWFP itself.”<sup>350</sup>

The conflict between the Taliban and the U.S. backed Pakistani military has also undermined the authority and capacity of the tribal elders.

Fata is now almost entirely controlled by the Pakistani Taleban militias who in turn provide protection to the Afghan Taleban and to al-Qaeda. Over the last few years the army has failed to protect those tribal elders and people opposed to the Taleban, as a result they have either been killed or fled... Now the Pakistani Taleban are expanding their area of control in the settled areas of the North West Frontier Province and have reached Attock on the Indus river, which is really the cultural and social dividing line between Afghanistan-Central Asia and Punjab and the Indian subcontinent. This is a very dangerous development.<sup>351</sup>

Families report that their sons are being forcibly recruited into militant groups, and there is mass looting and complete lack of law. The battle between foreign militants and the Pakistani government has caused many poor people, who already lived well below the poverty line, to migrate to Peshawar in search of security and jobs. Ahmed Rashid estimated there are present between 200,000 and 400,000 refugees from FATA scattered in other parts of Pakistan, a relatively large number considering there are only about 3 million people who live in FATA.<sup>352</sup>

The effects in terms of repression, loss of security, income and service access, displacement and military harassment, and other such phenomena are considerable... If we consider that the imposition of security checks, patrols, curfews, restrictions on access to farmlands and other resources, discriminatory employment practices, closure of schools and other facilities, enforced use of identity cards, and so on, are all a part of critical military

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<sup>350</sup> *Economist*, “Asia: Taliban All Over,” 61.

<sup>351</sup> *BBC News*, “Militancy Will Not Run out of Steam.”

<sup>352</sup> *Ibid.*

strategy in South Asia, it may have an immense impact on the lives of children and their families.<sup>353</sup>

The legacy of conflict can be felt for many decades after it's over.

Afghanistan is one example. The country has yet to recover from the ideology of radical Islam that was fostered during and after the Soviet-Afghan war. FATA provided the breeding ground for many of the Taliban who fought against non-Pashtuns in the Afghan civil war, and this legacy of militancy continues to this day.

Another cost of the conflict in Pakistan is that it has further worsened its already shaky relations with Afghanistan. Both countries have been rivals historically and this conflict has further fueled feelings of mistrust. U.S. lawmakers are urging the Pakistani government to show more substantial results in the tribal areas. Afghans in towns bordering Pakistan are becoming victims of attacks from violence entrepreneurs that cross the border freely. In a country where the security situation remains unpredictable, especially in eastern Afghanistan, the rise of militants in Pakistan is only worsening the situation.

### *III. The Future*

The Governments of Pakistan, U.S. and Afghanistan have acknowledged that they need to do more to root out “terrorists,” which would involve implementing more sound economic measures to steer people away from violence entrepreneurs. Pakistan and its allies are caught in a quandary because while there is a need for economic development measures, they are also logistically difficult to implement

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<sup>353</sup> Jo De Berry, Jo Boyden, Thomas Feeney and Jason Hart, “Children Affected by Armed Conflict in South Asia: A Review of Trends and Issues Identified Through Secondary Research,” Refugees Studies Center: UNICEF, February 2002, 44.

because of the monopoly of violence entrepreneurs and the complete breakdown of law and order in the areas where they have ascended to power. What the government can do is keep the currents of militancy from spreading to parts of the FATA that have thus far been safe from Taliban-type groups. The same can be said for settled areas, which are at great risk of falling into the hands of militants if there are not any measures taken to stop them. In Waziristan Agencies and regions where violence entrepreneurs prevent foreign aid workers from entering, the Government of Pakistan can attempt to foster serious negotiations. But in the coming years, it will be important to take steps to ensure that the risk of the conflict escalating into other tribal areas is reduced, if not eliminated.

The first important step would be to reduce rent-seeking opportunities and corruption at both the military and tribal level. Aid that is meant for the poorest of the poor rarely trickles down to the people it is meant for because of the government bureaucracy. In the tribal areas, any projects have to be first approved by the central government, then the provincial government, then the Political Agent, and then the tribes themselves. It does not follow a linear progression; rather, it has to go through multiple channels and people and offices. Additionally, divisions within Pakistan's central government need to be resolved. The coalition of opposition parties that came to power in early 2008 threatened to impeach Pervez Musharraf, leading him to resign from his post. The coalition itself is hardly united, with the Pakistan People's Party demanding a different political and economic agenda than Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan

Muslim League party. At the same time, tribal areas that lack strong institutions are finding themselves under the leadership of *mullahs* who want to impose *shariah* law.

The pouring of foreign money into Pakistan should be monitored closely. This not just includes U.S. aid, but also money flowing in from the Middle East. This funding is mostly used to encourage a more radical interpretation of Islam in *madrasahs* that fill the void of schooling in cities where there are no public or non-Islamic private schools. Musharraf vowed to track foreign money inflows into the country during the early part of his post-coup regime, but that task has met with mediocre success.

It is also important to implement economic measures at the grassroots level that benefit local people and deter them from joining rebel forces. Investing in human capital by expanding education and available health services is one key way to build the economy. While militants have taken over a big part of FATA and other settled areas, economic development measures in other cities where they have not yet infiltrated can help build a strong civil society and pool of educated Pakistanis.

Institutions that give legal protection to minorities, guarantee freedom from expropriation, grant freedom from repudiation of contracts, and facilitate cooperation for public services would constrain the amount of damage that one ethnic group could do to another... Ethnically diverse nations that wish to endure in peace and prosperity must build good institutions.<sup>354</sup>

A strong governance structure is also required to prevent militants from establishing parallel and illegal administrative structures. One of the chief ways that the Brussels-based Crisis Group argues that this can be done is by incorporating

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<sup>354</sup> Easterly, "Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 49, no. 4 (2001), 690.



FATA into the NWFP as a Provincially Administered Tribal Area (PATA), under executive control of the regular province and national court system. In addition, they propose allowing political parties to campaign in FATA and introduce party-based elections. While such a measure would be difficult to implement if the tribes do not accept it, there is a need to promote some sort of an institutional structure to prevent militants from filling the void. In terms of education, health care and employment, by bringing FATA's statistics up to the level of other regions, the government will have a stronger chance of reducing conflict than by simple military might. The Government of Pakistan and its allies still have a part to play in the economic development of regions of FATA that currently are not monopolized by militants.

Afghanistan and the international community also need to address their shortcomings and failures in implementing safety and security policies, and provide not only sufficient funds for reconstruction and nation-building to the Pashtun population, but also to ensure that aid reaches the people it is aimed at. Afghanistan has a long way to go in terms of development and security. The Government of Pakistan also needs to unite and place more emphasis on problems in the country rather than quarreling amongst themselves.

FATA will play a crucial role in the trajectory of the "war on terror." North and South Waziristan Agencies, which are isolated from the rest of Pakistan historically, economically and socially, will be at the forefront of the war against Al-Qaeda. U.S. lawmakers have said consistently that Osama bin Laden is finding refuge among local tribesmen and Taliban. The conflict that is taking place in the northwest

Frontier of Pakistan cannot be solved with military might alone, as the British learned. Measures need to be taken to eliminate policies that enable rent-seeking and foster income inequality, that instead develop the economy of the tribal areas, which, today, is mostly based on drug trade concentrated into the hands of a small sliver of society.

The Great Game that was one played out in the Indian subcontinent between the British and the Russians has not gone away; the only difference is now there are new players and new strategies. As Caroe would say, it is merely “new wine in old bottles.” The Great Game will continue to play out in the foothills of FATA for a long time to come.

## **APPENDIX 1**

### **British Frontier Expeditions<sup>355</sup>**

<b><u>Year</u></b>	<b><u>Tribes</u></b>	<b><u>Reason</u></b>
1849	Baizais	---
1850	Kohat pass Afridis	---
1851	Miranzai Tribes	---
1851-2	Mohmands	---
1851-2	Utmanzai Wazirs	Tribes defaulted on their payments to the chief responsible for collection.
1852	Ranizais	---
1852	Darwesh Khel Waziris	---
1852-3	Hassanzais	---
1853	Shiranis	---
1853	Adam Khel Afridis	Tribesmen closed the Kohat Pass and rose in rebellion despite being paid an allowance for “protecting” travelers.
1854	Mohmands	---
1855	Aka Khel Afridis	---
1855	Miranzai	---
1855	Rabia Khel Orakzais	---
1856	Turis	---
1857	Yusufzais	Pashtun <i>mujahideen</i> raised arms against the British during the Indian Mutiny.
1859	Khudu Khels	---
1859-60	Kabul Kher Wazirs	Tribes’ raided salt mines, resulting in a tug of war over control of communication routes.
1860	Mahsud Wazirs	Tribes attacked caravans and raided the town of Tank. Blockade against the Mahsuds by the British lasted for nearly 12 years.
1863	Sayyid Ahmad and his followers	The group claimed <i>jihad</i> against the British. This expedition was known as the “Ambela Campaign” after the strategic pass near which the fighting occurred.

<sup>355</sup> Compiled from Davies, *The North-West Frontier*; Caroe, *The Pathans*; Spain, *Pathan Borderland and Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India*, vol. II, *North-West Frontier Tribes Between the Kabul and Gumal Rivers* (Quetta, Pakistan: Nissa Traders, 1910).

1864	Mohmands	---
1868	Bizoti Orakzais Black Mountain Tribes	British continued their efforts to root out Sayyid Ahmad's followers. This was the largest British force mounted on the Frontier up to this date.
1869	Bizoti Orakzais	---
1872	Dawaris	---
1877	Jowaki Afridis	---
1877-8	Jowaki Afridis	---
1878	Utman Khels	---
1878	Ranizais	---
1878-9	Zakka Khel Afridis	---
January 1879	Suliman Khel, <i>Powindahs</i> and others	Tribes raided the town of Tank.
1879	Zaimukhts	---
1879-80	Mohmands	---
1880	Bhittanis	---
1880	Kabul Khel Wazirs	---
1880	Malik Shahi Wazirs	Tribes were punished for unpaid fines and penalties for minor offences, such as thefts of cattle and property.
April 1880	Bhittanis of Jandola	Tribesmen gathered to attack British.
1881	Mahsuds	Locals attacked a British post.
1887	Bunerwals	---
1888	Black Mountain Tribes	---
1891	Orakzai	Tribes attacked a British column attempting to construct pickets along the Samana Range.
1894	Mullah Powindah and his men (mostly Mahsuds)	The coalition of tribesmen attempted to expunge the British following the establishment of the Durand Line.
1897-8	Various tribes	In what was dubbed the "Great Tribal Uprising," more than 60,000 troops were stationed in the frontier. Some British historians said it was religious uprising, others believed it was a concerted effort to drive the British from the area, while some others saw the events as unconnected to each other.
1897-8	Maizarwals	A dispute on payment of blood-money due to a Hindu man's family.
1900-1	Mahsud Wazirs	Raids and attacks against the British

		led the latter to stop distribution of allowances to the <i>maliks</i> and block the tribesmen from the settled areas.
1902	Darwesh Khel Wazirs (in Kabul Khel)	Tribesmen refused to hand over outlaws wanted by the British.
1908	Zakka Khel Afridi	Tribesmen robbed and murdered a wealthy Hindu merchant.
1908	Mohmands	
1919-21	Wazirs and Mahsuds	Tribal uprising in the aftermath of the Third Anglo-Afghan War. Total cost to British India of this campaign was estimated at more than £ 1 million, much greater than the actual cost of the war with Afghanistan.
1923	Afridis	Locals kidnapped a young British girl.
1930-1	Abd-ul-Ghaffar Khan and “Khudai Khitmatgars,” or “Servants of God.”	A parallel administration started to develop outside of the British system that threatened to overthrow the latter.
1930	Mahsuds	---
1933	Mahsuds	Afghans cross the Durand Line with the help of Nadir Khan in tribal territory.
1936-8	Haji Mirza Ali Khan, the Faqir of Ipi, a Tori Khel <i>mullah</i> of the Utmanzai Wazirs, and several tribes in Waziristan	An array of factors led to this expedition, including raiding and attacking by tribesmen.
1939	Faqir of Ipi and Wazir tribes	Religious uprising to uproot British forced from the Frontier.
1937-40	Mahsuds	A “holy man” from Syria came into the tribal territory to enlist the tribes to fight in Kabul, was ousted by British.
March 1947	Various tribes	Communal uprising in Peshawar and surrounding areas.

## **GLOSSARY**

*Alim*: Senior religious Islamic scholars.

*Badal*: Revenge; also translated as exchange or reciprocity. It is one of the tenets of *Pukhtunwali*.

*Bibi*: Women from wealthy families.

*Bibiane*: Plural for *bibi*.

*Burkha*: A covering of women that hides them from head to toe, with only their eyes visible.

*Daman*: A great plain stretching between the Indus and the Sulaiman Mountain; a natural desert transformed by irrigation.

*Ghairilaqa*: See *ilaqa ghair*.

*Gham*: Grief or sadness.

*Hal Wayel*: Speaking of the inner state.

*Haq Mehr*: A pre-determined amount of money a man grants a woman after divorce

*Ilaqa Ghair*: Also known as *ghairilaqa*, meaning “outside the area” or “foreign area.”

*Loya Jirga*: The supreme council of elders.

*Jihad*: Holy war, interpretation of which has been disputed among scholars.

*Jirga*: A council of elders that deals with civil and criminal offenses and makes decisions for the tribe.

*Madrassahs*: Religious schools.

*Maliks*: Chiefs who act as intermediaries between the administration and the tribes.

*Maulanas*: See *Mullah*.

*Melmastia*: Hospitality; one of the tenets of *Pukhtunwali*.

*Mujahid*: One who wages *jihad*.

*Mujahideen*: Term for the Afghan alliance that fought against the Russians in the Afghan-Soviet war. Plural for word *mujahid*.

*Mullahs*: Religious leaders. Also referred to as *Maulanas* or *Maulvis*.

*Muwajib*: System of allowances to the tribes started by the British.

*Nanawatee*: Generosity to a defeated opponent; one of the tenets of *Pukhtunwali*.

*Nang*: Pashtun hill tribes that organize social life according to *Pukhtunwali*. Also means honor, one of the tenets of *Pukhtunwali*.

*Pukhtunwali*: The Pashtun tribal code which dictates the guidelines for living.

*Pukhtunistan*: An independent Pashtun country, the idea of which has only existed in theory.

*Purdah*: Veiling.

*Rewaj*: Custom.

*Shariah*: Islamic law.

*Talib*: Arabic for student.

*Taliban*: Plural of *Talib*.

*Talibanization*: Term used to describe spread of Taliban ideology.

*Tor*: Upholding female honor.

*Tora*: Courage; one of the tenets of *Pukhtunwali*.

*Ulema*: Plural for *Alim*.

*Wahabbism*: Branch of Islam practiced by those who follow the teachings of Saudi scholar Muhammed Ibn Abdul Wahhab, who helped reintroduce a strict interpretation of *shariah* to the Arabian peninsula.

*Xadi*: Joy or festivity.

*Yaghistan*: Land of rebels.

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